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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CALIFORNIA’S CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAM AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGN 
OF FUTURE STATE PROGRAMS  
Thomas Alcorn* 
Global climate change has emerged as one of the greatest challenges of our 
time. While action has stalled on the national stage, states have started to take 
action to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. Confronted with the risk of se-
vere impacts that could cost it tens of billions of dollars annually by the end of the 
century, California has taken the lead and developed the first comprehensive 
cap-and-trade program in the nation and seeks to achieve significant reductions 
in the greenhouse gas emissions associated with its economy. The success of Cali-
fornia’s program will determine whether other states and the federal government 
follow California’s lead. If California’s cap-and-trade program is defeated by le-
gal challenges or is excessively economically burdensome, it might spell the end of 
cap-and-trade programs in the United States. The most formidable legal chal-
lenge will be brought under the dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits 
states from discriminating against, regulating, or unduly burdening interstate 
commerce. This Article analyzes California’s cap-and-trade program under the 
dormant Commerce Clause and suggests refinements that could be adopted by 
California or other states implementing cap-and-trade programs to improve the 
odds of prevailing against such a challenge. While California will almost cer-
tainly be forced to make regulatory concessions, especially in its regulation of the 
electricity sector, I conclude that state cap-and-trade programs can be structured 
in a way that, while not ideal, can survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny 
while providing meaningful regulation of greenhouse gas emissions and protection 
from emissions leakage.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequenc-
es to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that 
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country. 
–Justice Louis Brandeis1 
Once again, California has taken the lead in pioneering environmental 
regulations to deal with one of the greatest environmental threats of our 
time: climate change.2 The stakes are high. Unabated, climate change will 
have far-reaching effects, including widespread droughts, rising sea levels, 
severe heat waves, and biodiversity loss.3 It is vital that action be taken to 
                                                                                                                      
 1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & 
Thomas, J., dissenting) (“One o� federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes 
innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.’” (quoting Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311)). 
 2. There is a clear scientific consensus that climate change is happening. See, e.g., 
Letter from the Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci. to United States Senators 1 (Oct. 21, 
2009), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/ssi/climate-change-statement-
from.pdf (letter signed by the official representatives of eighteen scientific societies); Com-
mittee on America’s Climate Choices, America’s Climate Choices (2011), NAT’L ACADEMIES, 
http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Americas-Climate-Choices/12781 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013); 
William R. L. Anderegg, James W. Prall, Jacob Harold & Stephen H. Schneider, Expert 
Credibility in Climate Change, 107 PNAS 12107, 12107–09 (2010), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/107/27/12107.full.pdf+html. 
 3. There has already been substantial warming that is causing massive droughts, 
forest fires, and other problems; see, e.g., Jef� Black, July Is Hottest Month on Record; Drought 
Expands to 63 Percent of United States, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 8, 2012, 1:02 PM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/08/13182298-july-is-hottest-month-on-record-
drought-expands-to-63-percent-of-united-states?lite (record-breaking heat waves and wide-
spread drought in United States); Joshua Lott, Wildfire Season 2012, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/forest_and_brush_fires/index.html (last 
updated June 26, 2012) (especially volatile wildfire season); Sue Ogrocki, Blame Blistering 
Heat Waves on Global Warming, Study Says, NBCNEWS.COM (Aug. 5, 2012, 11:04 AM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/05/13129330-blame-blistering-heat-waves-on-
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reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and California has moved to the 
forefront by developing the first economy-wide cap-and-trade program in 
the United States.4 California’s experiment is likely to determine the fate of 
serious efforts to reduce GHG emissions in the United States. Successfully 
implementing a cap-and-trade program would encourage other states to 
join and possibly catalyze federal action, as California’s environmental 
initiatives have in the past.5 Failing to overcome legal challenges against, or 
manage the potentially negative economic impacts of, the program could 
spell the end for cap-and-trade programs in the United States. 
Other efforts at implementing programs to reduce GHG emissions in 
the United States, and indeed throughout the world, have met with mixed 
results.6 At the federal level, Congress appears unwilling to tackle climate 
change in the near future.7 After Congress failed to pass a climate change 
bill, President Obama, acting through the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA), moved forward with new rules setting emission standards for 
vehicles and the highest-emitting new power plants and industrial facili-
ties.8 These regulations are being vigorously opposed by many Republicans 
                                                                                                                      
global-warming-study-says?lite (record-breaking heat waves caused by climate change). See 
also infra Part I.A. 
 4. Jason Dearen, California ‘Cap-and-Trade Plan’ Poised to be Finalized, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Oct. 20, 2011, 8:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/california-cap-
and-trade_n_1022314.html. A cap-and-trade program is a method of reducing GHG emis-
sions. A cap is placed on the total quantity of GHG emissions, and the cap is reduced each 
year to achieve the desired reduction in GHG emissions. The cap is enforced through the 
allocation of allowances that allow regulated entities to emit GHGs. These allowances can be 
traded by regulated entities so that the most cost-effective reductions are undertaken. See 
infra text accompanying notes 64–71. 
 5. Brie� for Professors o� Envtl. Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6–
18, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 
12-15135), 2012 WL 2376704. 
 6. See, e.g., Erin Conway-Smith, COP 17: Deal Reached at UN Climate Talks in Durban, 
GLOBALPOST (Dec. 11, 2011, 5:53 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/ 
africa/south-africa/111211/cop-17-news-durban-platform-deal-reached-un-climate-change-
talks (mixed results from international negotiations); Jim Efstathiou Jr., Obama Faces Tough 
Fight Over EPA’s Carbon Emission Rules, Beinecke Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2010, 6:01 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-15/obama-faces-tough-fight-over-epa-s-carbon-
emission-rules-beinecke-says.html (federal cap-and-trade bill passed by House o� Represent-
atives but not Senate). 
 7. Ben Geman, Heat Wave, Fires Have Climate Change Activists Going On the Offensive, 
THE HILL (July 6, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/236391-heat-
wave-fires-leave-some-climate-change-supporters-looking-to-go-on-offense (“Global warm-
ing legislation collapsed in Congress in 2010 and has no chance of advancement in the 
foreseeable future.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Court Backs E.P.A. Over Emissions Limits Intended to Reduce 
Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/science/earth/epa-
emissions-rules-backed-by-court.html. 
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and may be eliminated by legislation stripping the EPA of its authority to 
regulate GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act.9 
With federal action on climate change limited and of uncertain longevi-
ty, states have taken the lead by developing subnational strategies to reduce 
GHG emissions. The first regional cap-and-trade program for GHG emis-
sions was implemented by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI), a consortium of nine Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states.10 The 
program, which began in 2009, is limited to the electricity sector and seeks 
to reduce GHG emissions to 10 percent below 2009 levels by 2018.11 While 
the RGGI program represents a promising start, its reductions of GHG 
emissions are small and might not even be attained.12 
A second consortium formed to address climate change is the Western 
Climate Initiative (WCI).13 At its height, it had seven state and four Cana-
dian province members14 that planned to implement a comprehensive 
regional cap-and-trade program to reduce GHG emissions to 15 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2020.15 Every state besides California withdrew from 
the WCI, and only California and Quebec started cap-and-trade programs 
                                                                                                                      
 9. Id.  
 10. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org (last visited Feb. 
22, 2013). The nine state members of the RGGI are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id. 
 11. About the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited June 3, 2013); The 
RGGI CO2 Cap, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/design/overview/cap 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
 12. The RGGI is at risk for significant leakage, which occurs when regulated entities 
move from a regulating state to a nonregulating state to avoid having to reduce emissions. 
RICHARD COWART, ADDRESSING LEAKAGE IN A CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM: TREATING 
IMPORTS AS SOURCES 1–4 (2006), available at http://www.raponline.org/docs/RAP 
_Cowart_CapAndTradeLeakage_2006_11.pdf. The electricity sector is especially prone to 
leakage because of the ease with which electricity can be transported.  
 13. WCI Partners Release Their Comprehensive Strategy to Address Climate Change and 
Spur a Clean-Energy Economy, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE (July 27, 2010), http://www.western 
climateinitiative.org/component/remository/general/program-design/Program-Design-
Release-Statement/. 
 14. The state partners included Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Utah, and Washington, and the Canadian province partners include British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. History, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.western 
climateinitiative.org/history (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
 15. Frequently Asked Questions, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateini 
tiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/faq (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
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in 2013.16 Legal challenges to California’s program have already been 
launched17 and more are sure to follow.18  
The most significant legal challenge to California’s cap-and-trade pro-
gram will be brought under the dormant Commerce Clause,19 which 
prohibits states from discriminating against, extraterritorially regulating, or 
unduly burdening interstate commerce.20 Indeed, a federal district court 
struck down California’s low carbon fuel standard, another part of the state’s 
comprehensive plan to reduce GHG emissions, under the dormant Com-
merce Clause.21 While this decision was recently reversed by the Ninth 
Circuit by a two-to-one vote on appeal, it highlights the significant threat 
                                                                                                                      
 16. See Marc D. Luesebrink, Carb Cap and Trade Linkage Effort with Quebec Back on 
Track: Reopened Comment Period Ends January 23rd, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8a7821d5-a122-4c66-a6ed-8aa5cb0dd1fc. 
 17. Cassandra Sweet, California Cap-and-Trade Faces Potential Hurdle, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 3, 2011, 7:11 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870330090457617 
8431416877032.html. Environmental justice groups challenged the cap-and-trade regulations 
under the California Environmental Quality Act, alleging that an inadequate environmental 
review was undertaken and that the cap-and-trade program was not authorized by statute. Id. 
The trial court held that the program was authorized but ordered regulators to more thor-
oughly assess the alternatives (for example, a carbon tax) and explain why they were rejected. 
Ass’n o� Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 70–71 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s holding that the cap-and-trade program 
was authorized by statute. Id. at 79–81. Environmental justice groups have also challenged 
the offset protocols on the basis that they undermine the climate change statute and have 
filed a complaint with the EPA alleging violations of constitutional rights because the cap-
and-trade program will increase pollution in poor neighborhoods. Jane K. Murphy, Califor-
nia’s Greenhouse Gas “Cap and Trade” Program Survives Legal Challenge, MONDAQ (Aug. 20, 
2012), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/192176/Climate+Change/US+Regulatory+De 
velopments; Peter Fimrite, EPA Complaint Says Cap and Trade Racially Biased, S.F. CHRON. 
(June 12, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/EPA-complaint-says-cap-
and-trade-racially-biased-3626368.php. This challenge was defeated in the trial court. Karen 
Gullo & Lynn Doan, California Defeats Lawsuit Against Cap-and-Trade Program, BLOOMBERG 
(Jan. 28, 2013, 4:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-28/california-defeats-
lawsuit-against-cap-and-trade-program-1-.html. Finally, the California Chamber of Com-
merce has challenged the program on the basis that the sale of permits constitutes an 
unauthorized and unconstitutional tax under California law. Jason Dearen, California Group 
Sues To Invalidate Cap-and-Trade, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 13, 2012), http:// 
www.businessweek.com/ap/2012-11-13/calif-dot-group-sues-to-invalidate-cap-and-trade. 
 18. In addition to private parties, the attorney generals of at least four states, Ala-
bama, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Texas, are considering suing to stop California’s cap-
and-trade program on the basis that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Mark 
Schapiro, Four States Prepare Legal Assault on California’s Climate Law, CAL. WATCH (Sept. 8, 
2010), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/four-states-prepare-legal-assault-californias-clim 
ate-law-4564. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1084–94 
(E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th 
Cir. 2013). 
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that the dormant Commerce Clause poses to state regulation.22 Although 
the dormant Commerce Clause mandate is normally easy enough to comply 
with, the complexities of the modern economy, especially the electricity 
markets, make it exceptionally difficult to create an effective cap-and-trade 
program that is free of dormant Commerce Clause problems. 
This Article assesses the constitutionality of California’s cap-and-trade 
program under the dormant Commerce Clause, both analyzing the most 
important issues facing California and other states considering cap-and-
trade programs and suggesting refinements that improve the odds of sur-
viving scrutiny. As California is currently only regulating imports in the 
electricity sector, much of this Article focuses on the regulation of the elec-
tricity sector. Notably, this appears to be the first time that a state has 
attempted to regulate imported goods to account for associated air pollu-
tion. Part I describes California’s interest in abating climate change, the 
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006,23 and the design of 
California’s cap-and-trade program. Part II examines the relevant dormant 
Commerce Clause case law, attempting to bring coherence to an area of the 
law that Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has described as “ ‘tangled 
underbrush’ ” that “has proved virtually unworkable in application.”24 
Part III evaluates California’s cap-and-trade program under the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, focusing on the features that are most 
vulnerable to a challenge. In addition to analyzing California’s adopted 
approach, I suggest refinements that improve the odds that California’s cap-
and-trade program will withstand a challenge and that could be adopted by 
other states designing cap-and-trade programs. While some regulatory 
concessions are likely to be necessary, I conclude that states can effectively 
regulate GHG emissions using cap-and-trade programs despite the limita-
tions imposed by the dormant Commerce Clause.  
I. THE CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM 
A. California’s Special Interest in Abating Climate Change 
Climate change has already come to California, and it is expected to 
have severe impacts on the state over the next century.25 California has seen 
climate change cause its snowfall to change to rain, its wildfire seasons to 
                                                                                                                      
 22. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1077-78. 
 23. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2012). 
 24. Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town o� Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610–12 & n.3 
(1997) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nw. States 
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959)). 
 25. Mary D. Nichols, California’s Climate Change Program: Lessons for the Nation, 27 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 185, 186–87 (2009). 
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lengthen and intensify, its sea levels to rise seven inches in the last century, 
and its air quality to deteriorate.26 These effects are expected to worsen 
even if GHG emissions are reduced to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 
2050, and they are expected to significantly worsen if GHG emissions 
continue unabated under business as usual.27 A look at the expected impacts 
of climate change under the business-as-usual scenario will shed some light 
on the magnitude of California’s interest in reducing GHG emissions. 
First, climate change is expected to increase the average temperature in 
California by 0.5–2°C within the first thirty years of the twenty-first centu-
ry and by 1.5–5.8°C by the last thirty years of the twenty-first century.28 
Second, it is expected to strain California’s water supply, with most models 
predicting that precipitation will decrease by approximately 5% in the  
Sacramento area and 15% or more in Southern California.29 Additionally, 
California’s snowpack is expected to melt off earlier and decrease in size.30 
When these effects are combined with the expected increase in evaporative 
water loss from the higher temperatures,31 the potential shortfall of water 
from expected demand (accounting for population and urban growth) in 
2050 is staggering: 5.2 million acre-feet per year, even after reducing envi-
ronmental flow requirements for a number of major rivers.32 Considering 
that California already faces severe water shortages, this does not portend 
well for California’s profitable farming industry, which consumes 80% of 
the water used in California, especially in conjunction with projected de-
creases in yields as a result of climate change.33 Gross annual agricultural 
revenues could decline by as much as $3 billion by 2050.34 
Third, the increased temperatures and decreased precipitation will in-
tensify the forest fires that already ravage California during the summer.35 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Id. 
 27. See Bettina Boxall, Report Outlines Possible Effects of Warming on California, L.A. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/02/local/me-climate2; CLIMATE 
ACTION TEAM, CLIMATE ACTION TEAM BIENNIAL REPORT 1.3–.28 (2010), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CAT-1000-2010-004/CAT-1000-2010-004.PDF 
(providing a comprehensive assessment of climate change risks to California based on 
scientific studies); Nichols, supra note 25, at 186–87. 
 28. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.5–.6. 
 29. Id. at 1.7. 
 30. Id. at 1.8. 
 31. Id. at 1.7. 
 32. Id. at 1.18. 
 33. CTR. FOR IRRIGATION TECH., CAL. STATE UNIV., FRESNO, AGRICULTURE 
WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: A 2011 UPDATE 3 (2011), available at www.californiawater.org/ 
cwi/docs/CIT_AWU_REPORT_v2.pdf.  
 34. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 2.4–.9. This estimate accounts for 
expected crop substitutions. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1.12–.14; Governor Jerry Brown Declares State of Emergency in Counties Affected 
by Wildfire, NBCNEWS.COM (August 21, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/ 
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The mean number o� large fires is projected to increase by 58–128 percent 
and the mean burned area is projected to increase by 57–169 percent by 
2050.36 These increases are expected to result in additional fire costs of 
$0.2–2.3 billion annually by 2050 and $0.7–14 billion annually by 2085.37 
Fourth, sea levels are expected to rise eleven to eighteen inches by 2050 
and twenty-three to fifty-five inches by 2100.38 This rise is the projected 
result of reduced global snowpack (from melting) and thermal expansion of 
the sea induced by increased average global temperatures.39 Studies esti-
mate that $50 billion worth of property and 260,000 people are currently at 
risk for flooding.40 If sea levels rise by fifty-five inches, a total of $100 
billion worth of property and 475,000 people currently along the coast 
would be at risk for inundation by the sea.41 Building levees and sea walls to 
protect these areas is projected to cost at least $14 billion, with additional 
annual maintenance costs of $1.4 billion.42 Additionally, higher sea levels 
mean increased erosion that could result in a loss o� forty-one square miles 
of California coast by 2100.43 
Fifth, climate change is expected to worsen air quality and public 
health in California.44 Increased temperatures lead to increased biogenic 
emissions, strengthened temperature inversion events, and summertime 
stagnation episodes.45 Together, these effects increase ozone formation and 
                                                                                                                      
_news/2012/08/21/13394413-wildfires-wreak-havoc-across-western-us-smoke-visible-from-
space?lite. 
 36. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.12–.14. 
 37. Id. at 2.12. 
 38. Id. at 1.9–.12. 
 39. SUSANNE C. MOSER & GUIDO FRANCO, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, THE FUTURE IS 
NOW: AN UPDATE ON CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE, IMPACTS, AND RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR 
CALIFORNIA 5 (2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-500-
2008-077/CEC-500-2008-077.PDF (also noting that the rate of sea level rise has increased 
from 0.07 inches per year to 0.12 inches per year in the last decade of the twentieth century). 
 40. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.21–.23. 
 41. Id. at 1.21–.23, 2.18–.19. 
 42. Id. at 2.18–.19. 
 43. Id. at 2.19. 
 44. Id. at 1.26. California already experiences some of the worst air quality in the 
country, despite spending $10 billion annually to control air pollution. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1.26–.28. Biogenic emissions are “emissions of volatile organic compounds 
from vegetation and emissions of nitrogen oxides from soil.” Glossary, ENV’T CAN., 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/inrp-npri/default.asp?lang=en&n=9264E929-1#t (last updated May 14, 
2012). Temperature inversion events occur when warm air traps cold air and pollutants 
underneath it, typically near ground level. Stuart Tomlinson, Strong Temperature Inversion 
Will Keep It Cold and Smoggy in the Valleys, Unseasonably Warm in the Mountains, THE 
OREGONIAN (Jan. 15, 2013, 1:06 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/weather/index.ssf/ 
2013/01/strong_temperature_inversion_w.html. A stagnation event occurs when there is little 
change in the air located in a particular area, which results in the build-up of pollution. 
Weather Research and Forecasting Model Simulates Climate Change in California, DEP’T OF 
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particulate matter concentrations, leading to low air quality that threatens 
to wipe out all expected gains from pollution control through 2050.46 The 
cost of offsetting these effects to achieve targeted air quality is projected at 
$8 billion annually.47 The combination of worsening air quality and higher 
temperatures, including many extreme temperature events, is expected to 
cause increased mortality and to have adverse effects on public health gen-
erally.48 
Sixth, the increased temperatures and water transportation needs will 
require increased energy use in California.49 Residential energy demand is 
expected to grow above that anticipated from population growth by 7% in 
the next few decades and by up to 50% by the end of the century.50 In addi-
tion, California’s production of inexpensive hydropower, which accounts for 
15% of in-state energy generation, is expected to decline significantly by the 
end of the century.51 The residential-sector costs of increased energy use are 
projected at $1.6 billion annually by 2050 and $15 billion annually by 2100, 
and the loss of value from reduced hydropower production is estimated to 
cost $0.5 billion annually by 2085.52 
Finally, climate change is already affecting California’s ecosystems and 
these effects are expected to increase significantly.53 While the magnitude 
of environmental damage and the changes in environmental services are 
difficult to predict or monetize, California’s interest in preserving its  
environment and maintaining environmental services deserves significant 
weight when considering California’s interest in abating climate change.54 
B. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 and California’s 
Bold Leadership in Addressing Climate Change 
The California legislature passed the California Global Warming Solu-
tions Act, also known as Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), to address the 
                                                                                                                      
LAND, AIR AND WATER RES., UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS (2011), available at 
http://lawr.ucdavis.edu/newsletter/w11-climatechange.htm.  
 46. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 1.26–.28. 
 47. Id. at 2.25. 
 48. Id. at 1.28–.30. 
 49. Id. at 1.23–.24. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1.24–.25. 
 52. Id. at 2.23–.24. 
 53. MOSER & FRANCO, supra note 39, at 4. Changes in climate can wreak havoc on 
ecosystems. For example, the changes in seasonal timing alter the lifecycles and competitive-
ness of many plants and animals. Migratory birds are particularly vulnerable to these 
changes because their journey is timed to coincide with plentiful food. Changing seasonable 
timing can jeopardize the survival of these birds because they may no longer find the re-
sources that they need when they need them. Id. 
 54. CLIMATE ACTION TEAM, supra note 27, at 2.26. 
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potentially enormous costs of climate change by mandating that the state 
reduce its GHG emissions.55 The legislature clearly articulated its findings 
and intent: 
Global warming poses a serious threat to the economic well-being, 
public health, natural resources, and the environment of California. 
The potential adverse impacts of global warming include the exac-
erbation of air quality problems, a reduction in the quality and 
supply of water to the state from the Sierra snowpack, a rise in sea 
levels resulting in the displacement of thousands of coastal busi-
nesses and residences, damage to marine ecosystems and the 
natural environment, and an increase in the incidences of infectious 
diseases, asthma, and other human health-related problems. 
. . . . 
 . . . California has long been a national and international leader on 
energy conservation and environmental stewardship efforts . . . 
[and this law] will continue this tradition of environmental leader-
ship by placing California at the forefront of national and  
international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. 
 . . . National and international actions are necessary to fully ad-
dress the issue of global warming. However, action taken by 
California to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases will have far-
reaching effects by encouraging other states, the federal govern-
ment, and other countries to act. 
 . . . By exercising a global leadership role, California will also posi-
tion its economy, technology centers, financial institutions, and 
businesses to benefit from national and international efforts to re-
duce emissions of greenhouse gases . . . [while taking] a global 
economic and technological leadership role in reducing emissions 
of greenhouse gases.56 
AB 32 charged the California Air Resources Board (CARB) with de-
veloping a program to “achieve the maximum technologically feasible and 
cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions” possible.57 AB 32 
requires that, at an ambitious minimum, California reduce its GHG  
                                                                                                                      
 55. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (West 2012).  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. § 38562. CARB is to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride. 
Id. § 38505(g). 
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emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.58 To the extent feasible, CARB was or-
dered to design the cap-and-trade program in an equitable manner that 
minimizes costs and maximizes benefits to California. CARB was also 
directed to encourage “early action to reduce [GHGs],” take into account 
overall societal benefits that could be achieved, and “[m]inimize leakage.” 59 
CARB was given the power to create a program to reduce GHG emis-
sions, but it was required to ensure that the reductions of GHG emissions 
“achieved are real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, and enforceable.”60 
After assessing a variety of options for reducing carbon emissions, CARB 
decided to implement a cap-and-trade program. 
C. Cap-and-Trade Program Overview 
Pursuant to AB 32’s mandate, CARB has developed the first compre-
hensive cap-and-trade program in the United States. CARB’s governing 
board approved the final program, which regulates 85 percent of the sources 
of GHG emissions in California, on October 20, 2011.61 The program be-
came operational at the start of 2012, but regulated entities did not have 
compliance obligations until January 1, 2013.62 This section describes cap-
and-trade programs generally and then provides an overview of the Cali-
fornia program. 
Cap-and-trade programs are relatively simple to understand. First, a 
cap is placed on GHG emissions to stop further growth in the covered 
sectors.63 Then, a trajectory is developed for how this cap will decrease over 
time to reach the desired level of emissions on a target date.64 Allowances 
are created to enforce the cap, with each allowance conveying a right to 
emit one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (MTCO2e).
65 These 
allowances are distributed to the regulated entities either through direct 
allocation by the government or through auctions.66 Once the allowances 
                                                                                                                      
 58. Id. § 38550. 
 59. Id. § 38562(a)–(b). 
 60. Id. § 38562(c)–(d)(1). 
 61. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, 
RESOLUTION 11-32, at 10–11 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/ 
capandtrade10/res11-32.pdf [hereinafter RESOLUTION 11-32].  
 62. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED REGULATION TO IMPLEMENT THE 
CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM, STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF 
REASONS II-1 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/ 
capisor.pdf [hereinafter INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS]; Gina-Marie Cheeseman, Cali-
fornia and Quebec Will Link Cap-and-Trade Programs, TRIPLE PUNDIT (May 15, 2012), 
http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/05/california-quebec-will-link-cap-trade-programs/. 
 63. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-1 to -2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at II-3 to -4. 
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are distributed, the regulated entities are free to trade them with each oth-
er.67 Through this trading, GHG emissions are reduced in the most 
efficient manner.68 Regulated entities reduce their GHG emissions when 
the cost of doing so is less than the cost of allowances, and they then sell 
excess allowances to entities that cannot reduce emissions as cheaply.69 As 
the cap tightens and fewer allowances are distributed, the price of allowanc-
es and the cost of emissions reductions increase.70 
A cap-and-trade program would function very efficiently if the entire 
world participated because there would be no way to escape the regulation, 
such that real reductions in GHG emissions would have to occur for there 
to be compliance with the cap. In the real world, only some jurisdictions are 
regulating GHG emissions using cap-and-trade programs. As a result, 
emitters in the regulating jurisdictions are able to escape the cap-and-trade 
program by moving to nonregulating jurisdictions. Additionally, emitters in 
the regulating jurisdictions may lose market share to emitters in the non-
regulating jurisdictions. When either of these phenomena occurs, there are 
phantom reductions in GHG emissions because, while there is a reduction 
of emissions within the regulating jurisdictions, the total world emissions 
have not decreased. This is called “leakage,” and it can significantly reduce 
the effectiveness of cap-and-trade programs.71 
California has set ambitious targets for its reduction of GHGs, aiming 
to reduce GHGs to 1990 levels by 2020.72 Meeting this goal will require 
reducing GHG emissions by 11 percent below current levels and 29 percent 
below projected levels in 2020 under a business-as-usual scenario.73 To 
support the cap-and-trade program, CARB established GHG reporting 
requirements for facilities that emit 10,000 MTCO2e or more.
74 Since the 
EPA has promulgated its own mandatory GHG reporting requirements, 
California has adopted the EPA rules but adjusted them to impose the 
more stringent requirements necessary to support a cap-and-trade pro-
gram.75 
The program became operational in 2012, but it delayed imposing 
compliance obligations until January 1, 2013 to give regulators more time to 
implement, and regulated parties more time to understand and adjust to, 
                                                                                                                      
 67. Id. at II-1 to -2. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. at ES-2, II-1 to -2. 
 71. Id. at II-26. 
 72. RESOLUTION 11-32, supra note 61, at 6. 
 73. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX M., CPUC/CEC JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS 
M-9 (2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appm.pdf [hereinaf-
ter CPUC/CEC JOINT RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
 74. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-7 to -9. 
 75. Id. at II-8. 
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the program. A two-year compliance period began on January 1, 2013, and 
it will be followed by two three-year compliance periods, over which time 
the amount of emissions permitted (the “emissions cap”) decreases.76 The 
initial cap in 2013 requires emissions to be reduced below 2012 levels, and 
all electricity generators and large industrial facilities that emit 25,000 
MTCO2e or more are required to obtain allowances to emit GHGs.
77 Be-
ginning in 2015, the program expands to include fuel distributors, covering 
emissions from the combustion of gas, diesel, natural gas, and propane from 
entities with emissions below 25,000 MTCO2e, and the combustion o� fuels 
used in the transportation sector.78 
The program utilizes two different methods of allocating allowances to 
covered entities: an auction to the electricity sector, which is described in 
Part I.D, infra, and benchmarked, updating, output-based allocation to 
other industries.79 To create the output-based allocations, CARB assessed 
each industrial sector to determine its GHG intensity and its exposure to 
trade competition from industry in unregulated states, through which the 
industrial sector’s ability to pass compliance costs on to consumers is meas-
ured.80 Based on this analysis, an industry-specific assistance factor is 
assigned and plugged into an equation to determine how many free allow-
ances will be allocated to each industrial facility.81 The more trade exposed 
and GHG-intensive an industry, the more allowances it will be allocated for 
free.82 However, to keep facilities from shutting down or transferring pro-
duction out of the state and then selling their allocated allowances, the 
formula ties the allocation of allowances to the production output or energy 
use of each facility.83  
Two attributes of this method provide incentives for facilities to reduce 
their emissions. First, many facilities are not provided with all of the allow-
ances that they will need because they have not been provided a 100 percent 
assistance factor.84 Second, the allowances are allocated based on emissions 
benchmarks, which are basically the emissions per product produced or unit 
                                                                                                                      
 76. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95840 (2012). 
 77. Id. § 95851. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. §§ 95890–95891; INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-30. 
 80. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX K., LEAKAGE ANALYSIS K-8 to -30 
(2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appk.pdf [herein-
after LEAKAGE ANALYSIS]; INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-26 to -27. 
 81. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX J, ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION J-21 to -23 
(2010), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv4appj.pdf [herein-
after ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION]. 
 82. Id. at J-21 to -22. 
 83. Id. at J-31 to -32. 
 84. Id. at J-21 to -23. 
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of thermal energy used that the industry is expected to attain.85 The 
benchmark calculation is complicated, but benchmarks are essentially set at 
the emissions intensity o� highly efficient, low-emitting facilities in each 
industrial sector.86 This method of allocation creates incentives for facilities 
to reduce emissions because there is both the risk o� having to purchase 
more allowances and the potential benefit of selling excess allowances.87 As 
a result, the most efficient technologies will be used in each industry as 
regulators require less GHG emissions per product produced or unit of 
thermal energy used.88  
This benchmarked, updating, output-based allocation of allowances is 
designed to prevent leakage, which occurs when in-state businesses leave 
the regulating state to go to nonregulating states or when in-state business-
es lose market share to out-of-state businesses in nonregulating states.89 By 
requiring emissions reductions that will not force industries to leave the 
state, California can achieve emissions reductions with less harm to its 
economy.90 This approach to mitigating leakage, however, significantly 
lowers the attainable GHG reductions and potentially mutes the carbon 
price.91  
The allowances that are not allocated as aid will be auctioned, and the 
revenue generated will be placed in the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund 
(the “GHG Fund”) account.92 The GHG Fund will primarily be used to 
fund projects that reduce GHG emissions.93 To the extent feasible, the 
GHG Fund is also intended to be used to provide a wide array of other 
benefits to California, including improvement of environmental quality, 
creation of jobs, assistance with the impacts of climate change, and assis-
tance to disadvantaged communities.94 CARB is responsible for working 
with the Department o� Finance to develop a long-term investment plan in 
projects that reduce GHG emissions.95 The legislature has authorized  
                                                                                                                      
 85. Id. 
 86. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX B: DEV. OF PRODUCT BENCHMARKS FOR 
ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION 3 (2011), available at www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/ 
candtappb.pdf. 
 87. ALLOWANCE ALLOCATION, supra note 81, at J-21 to -23. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at J-18 to -19. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See James Bushnell & Yihsu Chen, Regulation, Allocation, and Leakage in Cap-and-
Trade Markets for CO2 5, 23–24 (Ctr. for the Study o� Energy Mkts., CSEM Working Paper 
No. 183, 2009), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/68q5f5td. See generally id. for a 
discussion of the impacts of adopting an output-based allowance allocation approach for the 
electricity sector. 
 92. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16428.8 (West 2012). 
 93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39712 (West 2013). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. § 39716. 
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funding to reduce GHG emissions: (1) “through energy efficiency, clean 
and renewable energy generation, distributed renewable energy genera-
tion,” improved transmission and storage technology, and other related 
projects; (2) “through the development of state-of-the-art systems to move 
goods and freight, advanced technology vehicles and vehicle infrastructure, 
advanced biofuels, and low-carbon and efficient public transportation” 
projects; (3) “associated with water use and supply, land and natural re-
sources conservation and management, forestry, and sustainable 
agriculture”; (4) “through strategic planning and development of sustaina-
ble infrastructure projects, including . . . transportation and housing”; (5) 
“through increased in-state diversion of municipal solid waste from disposal 
through waste reduction”; (6) through investments in programs implement-
ed by local agencies and organizations; and (7) through “research, 
development, and deployment of innovative technologies, measures, and 
practices related to” the projects authorized for funding.96 
The program has a number of cost containment mechanisms that are 
designed to keep auction allowance prices at economically affordable lev-
els.97 First, the use of multi-year compliance periods protects regulated 
parties from yearly variations in GHG emissions and provides them with 
some flexibility.98 Second, the program allows covered entities to bank 
allowances, which means that they can obtain and store allowances for use 
in future compliance periods.99 This encourages early reduction of emis-
sions because allowances are cheaper and more abundant at the start of the 
program.100 Third, there is an allowance price containment reserve from 
which CARB can auction allowances if they become too expensive.101 
Fourth, covered entities are allowed to purchase offset credits from ap-
proved programs in the North America, with program eligibility possibly 
expanding later.102 Offset credits are created when projects reduce GHGs 
in ways other than emissions reductions in covered sectors, and they can be 
used to meet compliance obligations in the same way as allowances.103 Al-
lowances and offset credits are collectively referred to as compliance 
instruments.104 Simple examples of offset programs include reforestation 
projects and restoration of at-risk ecological areas that act as carbon sinks.105 
                                                                                                                      
 96. Id. § 39712. 
 97. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-4. 
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 99. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95922 (2012). 
 100. Id. § 95841. 
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When there is sufficient oversight of offset projects to ensure that their 
emissions reductions are “real, permanent, quantifiable, verifiable, [and] 
enforceable,” offsets are effective at reducing the costs of, and encouraging 
innovative approaches to, reducing GHG emissions.106 Covered entities 
may meet up to 8 percent of their compliance obligations by submitting 
offset credits, allowing some flexibility without significantly undermining 
the cap.107 
Finally, California’s cap-and-trade program allows for linkage to other 
cap-and-trade programs that meet certain quality requirements.108 Linkage 
allows compliance instruments and offset credits from one cap-and-trade 
program to be used to meet compliance obligations in a linked cap-and-
trade program.109 This enhances flexibility and cost containment by ensur-
ing that the most efficient reductions of GHG emissions are utilized first, 
since there is a much larger pool of potential reductions that can be made.110 
By creating a larger market, it also provides enhanced stability of allowance 
prices.111 California is in the process of approving linkage to Quebec’s cap-
and-trade program, and it is likely that additional partners will be joined in 
the future.112 
D. Regulation of the Electricity Sector 
Having completed a basic overview of most of California’s cap-and-
trade program, we now turn to the energy sector. While the energy sector is 
very complex, the big picture is relatively easy to understand. Electricity is 
created by generators, which include coal facilities, natural gas facilities, 
nuclear facilities, and renewables such as solar and wind.113 The electricity 
is then sold on the electricity market to utilities, marketers, or, in some 
cases, directly to large end users.114 Utilities deliver electricity to a large 
number of small end users, such as individual residences and small busi-
nesses, over a large area.115 Marketers purchase electricity from many 
different generators and sell parts of the electricity bundle to utilities or 
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large end users.116 Large end users are generally industrial or manufacturing 
facilities that use large quantities of electricity.117 
The electricity market is, like other markets, governed by supply and 
demand, referred to as generation and load.118 Generation and load must 
always be in balance, such that one never exceeds the other.119 If an imbal-
ance occurs, the system crashes, and a blackout ensues.120 The entity 
overseeing this balancing is called a balancing authority.121 Electricity can-
not be economically stored at this time, such that the balance must be 
achieved through the real-time scheduling of generation and load.122 De-
spite the need for balance, particular electricity produced by a particular 
generator cannot be directed to a particular consumer.123 Electricity, which 
is a homogeneous stream of electrons, is pooled after it is generated and 
placed on the electricity grid, which is the transmission network over which 
electricity is sent from generators to load.124 This allows a unified transmis-
sion network, providing the benefits of an economy of scale.125 
The demand for electricity has a predictable cycle: it peaks during the 
day, particularly during the summer months, and troughs during the 
night.126 When load is at its lowest, the cheapest and most reliable genera-
tors, called baseload generators, operate and sell electricity.127 Baseload 
power is generally supplied by hydropower facilities, nuclear facilities, and 
coal facilities, which are cheaper to run for prolonged periods of time.128 
These plants are particularly well suited for supplying baseload power 
because they are expensive to ramp up and down (except for hydropower) 
but not costly to run continuously.129 As load increases, additional genera-
tors are brought online roughly in order of price until the load is met.130 
The “marginal” generator is the highest cost generator meeting load or the 
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next cheapest one in line to meet load.131 Gas-fired power plants are usually 
dispatched as marginal generators.132 As load changes over time, the mar-
ginal generator and the cost of the electricity also change.133 Electricity is 
bought and sold in megawatts per hour (MWhs) that are delivered over a 
certain time period.134 
California’s electricity sector accounts for 25% of the state’s total GHG 
emissions, and it is expected to accomplish 40% of the state’s GHG emis-
sions reductions by 2020.135 California produces approximately 68.5% and 
imports 31.5% of its electricity.136 In-state generation accounts for 44% of 
electricity sector GHG emissions, and imported electricity accounts for the 
remaining 56% of electricity sector emissions.137 This section explains how 
California is regulating the electricity sector’s emissions under the cap-and-
trade program. 
1. Regulation of California’s Electricity Sector 
While California adopted an output-based allocation approach to regu-
late most industries, it has not adopted this approach for the electricity 
sector.138 Instead, California adopted a first-jurisdictional-deliverer (FJD) 
approach that requires the first entity delivering load to the California 
electrical grid, which is the generator of the electricity when generation 
occurs in-state, to submit compliance instruments for the GHG emissions 
associated with the generation of the electricity if the generating facility 
emits 25,000 MTCO2e or more annually.
139  
A mixed direct-allocation and auction-based system has been developed 
to supply generators with allowances.140 The allowances will first be allocat-
ed to electrical distribution utilities (EDUs), including both publicly and 
privately owned utilities.141 CARB determined the number of allowances it 
will allocate to each EDU based on its historical emissions, current genera-
tion mix, sales, and efforts at decreasing its emissions since the passage of 
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AB 32.142 This holistic approach was chosen as a compromise between 
distributing allowances solely on the basis o� historical emissions, which 
would have rewarded those EDUs that have made the least progress in 
reducing emissions, and distributing allowances without regard to historical 
emissions, which would have harmed ratepayers.143 
The allowances allocated to the investor-owned utilities (IOUs) are 
placed in an account on their behalf, and the allowances in that account are 
sold at a blind auction to all generators that need allowances to meet their 
compliance obligations.144 This way IOUs that generate some of their own 
electricity are forced to bid for allowances on the same terms as other gen-
erators and cannot favor themselves.145 Publicly owned utilities (POUs) 
usually generate all of their own power and do not compete with independ-
ent power generators.146 Therefore, POUs are given the option of either 
using their allocated allowances to meet their compliance obligations (for 
generation owned by the POU or a joint power authority) or putting their 
allowances up for auction under the same terms applied to IOUs.147 The 
revenue from these auctions is to be used exclusively for providing rebates 
or customer bill relief to ratepayers to reduce the cap-and-trade program’s 
financial impacts on them.148 If this program were only applied to electrici-
ty generated within California, the goals of the cap-and-trade program 
would be severely undermined by leakage and resource (or contract) shuf-
fling. 
2. The Leakage and Resource Shuffling Problems 
When regulations are adopted in one jurisdiction but not others, this 
can cause prices and production costs to increase in the regulating jurisdic-
tion relative to prices and production costs in the nonregulating 
jurisdictions.149 This cost differential can lead to leakage, which occurs 
when businesses in the regulating jurisdiction move their operations to one 
of the nonregulating jurisdictions or lose market share to businesses in the 
                                                                                                                      
 142. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892 (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra 
note 62, at II-32 to -34; STAFF PROPOSAL, supra note 141, at 1–6.  
 143. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-32 to -34. 
 144. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892 (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra 
note 62, at II-31 to -32. 
 145. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-31 to -32. 
 146. Id. 
 147. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892(b)(2) (2012); INITIAL STATEMENT OF 
supra note 62, at II-31 to -32. 
 148. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95892(d) (2012). 
 149. LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
APPENDIX H., MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS H-51 (2007), available 
at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv3apph.pdf [hereinafter MARKET 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
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nonregulating jurisdictions.150 The practical effect o� leakage in the context 
of cap-and-trade programs is that emissions reductions in the regulating 
jurisdiction are offset by emissions increases in the nonregulating jurisdic-
tions as production and market share shift to the nonregulating jurisdic-
jurisdictions.151 Rather than a reduction in GHG emissions, the effect of 
the cap-and-trade program becomes economic harm to the regulating juris-
diction. Thus, in order for a cap-and-trade program to be effective and to 
achieve GHG reductions, it must prevent leakage to the greatest extent 
possible.152 
Unless California regulates imported electricity, it is at risk for signifi-
cant emissions leakage that would undermine its program.153 One study 
concluded that California will lose 25% of its emissions reductions in the 
electricity sector to leakage even if it regulates imported electricity under 
the FJD approach and that California could lose up to 100% of its emissions 
reductions in the electricity sector to leakage if it does not regulate import-
ed electricity.154 Other studies are in accord, predicting a large increase in 
imported electricity if California is unable to regulate imports under its 
cap-and-trade program.155 California has already aggressively pursued ener-
gy efficiency opportunities, making California’s electricity consumption one 
of the lowest in the nation, and reduced the GHG emissions intensity of its 
electricity sector, resulting in significantly lower emissions per MWh than 
the national average.156 When combined with the fact that coal accounts for 
                                                                                                                      
 150. LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51. 
 151. LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51. 
 152. LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51. 
 153. MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51. 
 154. KAREN PALMER, DALLAS BURTRAW & ANTHONY PAUL, ALLOWANCE 
ALLOCATION IN A CO2 EMISSIONS CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM FOR THE ELECTRICITY 
SECTOR IN CALIFORNIA, at iii, 25–26 (Res. for the Future, RFF Discussion Paper 09-41, 
2009), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-09-41.pdf. 
 155. See, e.g., Meredith L. Fowlie, Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Compe-
tition, and Emissions Leakage, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 72, 101 (2009); Bushnell & Chen, 
supra note 91, at 19–22 (even with considerable electricity industry assistance with an updat-
ing, output-based, or fuel-based allocation approach, significant leakage will cause California 
GHG emissions to decline by six million MTCO2e but regional emissions to decline by 
one million MTCO2e); Yihsu Chen, Andrew L. Liu & Benjamin F. Hobbs, Economic and 
Emissions Implications of Load-Based, Source-Based and First-Seller Emissions Trading Programs 
Under California AB32, 12–13 (Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst., Energy Policy and Econ. Working 
Paper No. 022, 2008), available at http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/PDF/EPE 
_022.pdf (most GHG emissions reductions will be lost to leakage and resource shuffling). 
 156. PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, supra note 154, at 1–3. The average emissions intensi-
ty of in-state electricity generation in 2004 was 0.318 MTCO2e, but the average increases to 
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very little of in-state electricity generation, this means that additional emis-
sions reductions in California’s electricity sector are likely to be relatively 
expensive for in-state generators.157 By contrast, leakage is a relatively 
inexpensive way for businesses to deal with cap-and-trade regulation.158 
Indeed, the RGGI, which auctioned allowances for the nominal sum of 
$1.93 in the December 2012 auction,159 faces estimates o� leakage from 17–
90%, with 50% being a generally accepted estimate, because it has not taken 
any action to prevent leakage.160 California’s required reductions are much 
higher, making its cost to businesses much higher. 
A second problem that arises when a cap-and-trade program is adopted 
in one jurisdiction but not others is resource shuffling, which is a type o� 
leakage.161 In order to avoid compliance obligations for importing electricity 
into the regulating jurisdiction, high-emitting generators in the nonregulat-
ing jurisdictions simply shift their electricity sales out of the regulating 
jurisdiction.162 Low-emitting generators in the nonregulating jurisdictions 
then fill this market share by selling their electricity into the regulating 
jurisdiction.163 While this decreases the emissions associated with electricity 
consumed in the regulating jurisdiction, it does not actually reduce emis-
sions overall because the total amount of emissions in both the regulating 
and nonregulating jurisdictions remains the same.164  
A number of studies have concluded that California’s cap-and-trade 
program is at significant risk for having its emissions reductions eliminated 
by resource shuffling.165 Because there is enough clean electricity generated 
in the western United States to meet most of California’s electricity needs, 
                                                                                                                      
0.422 MTCO2e when imported electricity is included. The national average was 0.534 
MTCO2e. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Bushnell & Chen, supra note 91, at 20–21. 
 159. Auction 18, REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/market/ 
co2_auctions/results/Auction-18 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013).  
 160. PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, supra note 154, at 24; Ian Sue Wing & Marek Kolodziej, 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Emission Leakage and the Effectiveness of Interstate Border 
Adjustments, 3–4, 24 (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Regulatory Policy Program 
Working Paper RPP-2008-03, 2008), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/rpp/Working%20papers/RPP_2008_03_SueWing.pdf (noting that leakage is likely to be 
49–57% despite little required reduction in emissions and low allowance prices). 
 161. MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-55. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., id.; James Bushnell, Carla Peterman & Catherine Wolfram, California’s 
Greenhouse Gas Policies: How Do They Add Up? 11 (Sept. 2008) (unpublished working 
paper) available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/wolfram/Papers/Energy_Journ_908.pdf; 
Chen, Liu & Hobbs, supra note 155, at 708–09.  
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that electricity could simply be reallocated to California.166 This would 
decrease the emissions intensity of California’s imported electricity while 
increasing the emissions intensity of the electricity used in the other west-
ern states.167 If this happens on a large enough scale, the illusory emissions 
reductions in the electricity sector could meet the targeted emissions reduc-
tions from the entire California program, even though no emissions  
reductions would have actually been achieved.168 While more reductions 
could be sought elsewhere, this would significantly impair California’s 
ability to reduce GHG emissions because the electricity sector has the 
greatest potential for emissions reductions.169 
The Market Advisory Committee that provided recommendations to 
CARB, as well as some commentators, have stated that while resource shuf-
fling is a risk, the risk is not as pronounced as those studies indicate.170 The 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and the legislature, 
through Senate Bill 1368, have already prohibited long-term contracts with 
high-emitting facilities.171 This resulted in resource shuffling o� lower-
emission electricity to California and possibly impacted generation-facility 
investment decisions in the West.172  
Additionally, only about 44% of out-of-state regional electricity genera-
tion is unassigned, or available to be shuffled.173 Only a small portion of 
this electricity is coal-fired, and coal generators are expected to have the 
strongest incentives to shuffle contracts.174 Indeed, a California Energy  
Commission study of imported electricity determined that, in the West, 
92% of coal generation is owned by utilities and 8% is owned by independ-
ent generators in long-term contracts.175 This coal generation is primarily 
used to supply baseload electricity rather than marginal electricity.176 This 
is the case because coal plants are well suited to providing baseload electric-
ity and poorly suited to providing marginal electricity, except when they 
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can do so in addition to supplying mostly baseload electricity.177 They are 
cheap to run continuously (in the absence of internalization of their GHG 
costs) and expensive to ramp up or down.178 The unassigned electricity is 
primarily composed of gas-fired generation in the Southwest and a mix of 
gas-fired and hydropower generation in the Northwest.179  
Resource shuffling may be further limited by renewable portfolio 
standards (RPSs) in other states, which require utilities to use renewable 
energy to supply a specified portion of their electricity.180 RPSs generally 
require utilities to obtain more renewable electricity than is currently avail-
able, which means that the majority of the renewable energy in the states 
that have RPSs may be used to satisfy the RPSs.181 This is somewhat uncer-
tain because many states allow renewable energy credits (RECs), which are 
the certificates used to demonstrate compliance with RPS requirements, to 
be unbundled from electricity and still satisfy the RPS requirements, po-
tentially allowing the same electricity to both be used to comply with RPS 
requirements in a state other than California and be used to serve Califor-
nia load.182 California has addressed this concern to some extent by 
requiring importers to retire RECs associated with the imported electricity 
in order to qualify for zero-emissions treatment.183 
Resource shuffling could become a much larger problem over the 
course of the cap-and-trade program as contracts between California pur-
chasers and out-of-state generators expire and high-emitting electricity 
currently being imported into California is directed elsewhere, creating an 
illusory reduction in emissions. This becomes less of an issue if investors 
move toward low-emission generation types as a result of the cap-and-trade 
program and if investors believe there is a significant risk that other states 
will implement their own cap-and-trade programs.184  
                                                                                                                      
 177. Explainer: Base Load and Peaking Power, KCET.ORG, http://www.kcet.org/news/ 
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3. Regulation o� Imported and Exported Electricity 
California is regulating imported electricity to accomplish two main 
ends: reduce the GHG emissions associated with in-state electricity con-
sumption and prevent leakage and resource shuffling that would undermine 
the cap-and-trade program.185 The FJD approach is being used to deter-
mine which entity has a compliance obligation.186 This is identical to regu-
regulation of electricity generated in-state because in both cases it is the 
party that first delivers electricity to the California grid that has a compli-
ance obligation, although with in-state electricity the obligation will fall on 
generators and with out-of-state electricity the obligation will fall on a mix 
of generators and marketers.187 CARB staff specifically chose this approach 
to regulate electricity “because it treats all importers and in-state generators 
the same.”188  
However, it is not always easy to identify the entity that is functioning 
as the FJD. CARB is assigning FJD status to the purchasing-selling entity 
listed on the NERC e-Tag189 that is created when the electricity is delivered 
between balancing authority areas, or to the facility operator or scheduling 
coordinator if the electricity does not cross balancing authority areas.190 
There are potential problems with using this method, as the California 
Independent System Operator (CAISO) balancing authority covers Cali-
fornia but extends beyond California’s borders in a few places, such that 
delivery of electricity into the CAISO balancing authority may not neces-
sarily mean delivery into California, although CAISO has stated that 
delivery to out-of-state interties within its coverage means that the electric-
ity is delivered to California.191 California plans to use contracts and other 
documentation to supplement the NERC e-Tag information in order to 
correctly identify the party with compliance obligations.192 
                                                                                                                      
 185. LEAKAGE ANALYSIS, supra note 80, at K-4; MARKET ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-51, H-54 to -55. 
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FIGURE 1. WESTERN ELECTRICITY COORDINATING COUNCIL 
BALANCING AUTHORITIES 
 
Note: This figure is taken from Western Interconnection Balancing Authorities, WECC.BIZ, 
http://www.wecc.biz/library/WECC%20Documents/Publications/WECC_BA_Map.pdf (last updated 
Nov. 27, 2012). 
 
While the point of regulation is the same, the regulatory approach to 
determining compliance obligations is different. Imported electricity comes 
from two types of sources: specified and unspecified.193 In order for a gen-
erating facility to be considered a specified source of electricity (at least 
when the facility is seeking an emission factor lower than the default emis-
sion factor discussed below), “[t]he electricity importer must be the facility 
operator or have right of ownership or a written power contract, as defined 
in MRR section 95102(a), to the amount of electricity claimed and generat-
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ed by the facility or unit claimed” and the electricity must be directly deliv-
ered to the California grid.194 Electricity is directly delivered when: (1) 
“[t]he [generating] facility has a first point of interconnection with a Cali-
fornia balancing authority”; (2) “[t]he [generating] facility has a first point 
of interconnection with distribution facilities used to serve end users within 
a California balancing authority area”; (3) “[t]he electricity is scheduled for 
delivery from the specified source into a California balancing authority via 
a continuous physical transmission path from interconnection of the facility 
in the balancing authority in which the facility is located to a sink located in 
the state of California”; or (4) “[t]here is an agreement to dynamically 
transfer electricity from the facility to a California balancing authority.”195 
The direct delivery requirement was adopted to help prevent resource 
shuffling by ensuring that the electricity was actually delivered to Califor-
nia.196 Additionally, i� RECs were created for the electricity generated, 
those RECs must be used for compliance with the California RPS or be 
retired.197  
Unspecified sources of electricity are all other sources, primarily “elec-
tricity that is not a specified source at the time of entry into the transaction 
to procure the electricity.”198 “Unspecified sources contribute to the bulk 
system power pool and typically are dispatchable, marginal resources 
that do not serve baseload.”199 Because unspecified electricity cannot be 
matched to a specific source, the GHG emissions are unknown.200 Unspeci-
fied sources are almost always the market’s marginal generators, and, 
because California does not import much power during off-peak hours, they 
are usually the peak-hour marginal generators.201  
Approximately 44 percent of California’s imported electricity is from 
unspecified sources.202 The remaining 56 percent of imported electricity 
can be traced to specific facilities whose emissions are known because they 
are owned by or in long-term contracts with California purchasers, or be-
cause their GHG emissions are reported to the Climate Registry.203 The 
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tables that follow break down where imported electricity originates and 
provide rough estimates of the generation mixes of specified and unspeci-
fied electricity imports from each originating region. 
TABLE 1. 2005 TOTAL ESTIMATED CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY 
IMPORTS (GWHS) 
Resource Type NW Percent SW Percent Total Percent 
Coal 1,758 7.9% 35,860 54.4% 37,617 42.6% 
Hydropower 10,723 48.0% 2,093 3.2% 12,816 14.5% 
Natural Gas 9,866 44.1% 20,83
9 
31.6% 30,705 34.8 
Nuclear 0 0.0% 7,074 10.7% 7,074 8.0% 
Renewables 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Total Imports (firm and system) 22,347 100.0% 65,866 100.0% 46,563 100.0% 
Note: This table is adapted and taken from ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at A-3 
tbl.A-3. Southwest (SW) is defined as including Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and 
Colorado. Id. at 25. Northwest (NW) is defined as including Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and 
Montana, and British Columbia hydropower. Id. at 24. 
 
TABLE 2. 2005 ESTIMATED SOUTHWEST IMPORT RESOURCE MIX 
IMPORTS (GWHS) 
Resource Type Specified Unspecified Total Unspecified Percent 
Percent 
Mix* 
Coal 34,992 868 35,860 2.4% 54.4% 
Hydropower 2,093 0 2,093 0.0% 3.2% 
Natural Gas 0 20,839 20,839 100.0% 31.6% 
Nuclear 7,074 0 7,074 0.0% 10.7% 
Renewables 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 
Total Imports 44,159 21,707 65,866 33.0% . . . 
Note: This table is adapted and taken from ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at A-2 to A-3 
tbls.A-2 & A-3. *Numbers do not add up to 100% due to rounding. 
 
TABLE 3. 2005 ESTIMATED NORTHWEST IMPORT RESOURCE MIX 
IMPORTS (GWHS) 
Resource Type Specified Unspecified Total Unspecified Percent Percent Mix 
Coal 900 858 1,758 48.8% 7.9% 
Hydropower 0 10,723 10,723 0.0% 48.0% 
Natural Gas 0 9,866 9,866 0.0% 44.1% 
Nuclear 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 
Renewables 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 
Total Imports 900 21,447 22,347 96.0% . . . 
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Note: This table is adapted and taken from ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra note 175, at A-2 to A-3 
tbls.A-2 & A-3.  
More recent estimates, for 2012, place the percentage of imported elec-
tricity from unspecified sources at 48.1 percent, with the remaining 51.9 
percent being specified imports.204 These more recent estimates indicate 
that the amount of specified imports coming from coal have decreased by 
almost half, while imports in other, lower emission categories have in-
creased substantially, indicating either resource shuffling or a shift toward 
lower-emission generation sources.205 
Out-of-state facilities that meet the requirements to be specified 
sources and are approved by CARB are treated the same as in-state facili-
ties. Importers of electricity from these specified sources only have 
compliance obligations for electricity from facilities that emit 25,000 
MTCO2e or more annually and must submit compliance instruments to 
cover the actual emissions generated for each MWh of imported electrici-
ty.206 
Importers of electricity from unspecified sources are subject to compli-
ance obligations for all imported electricity, regardless of whether or not the 
generating facility emits 25,000 MTCO2e or more annually.
207 Because this 
electricity cannot be matched to any particular generator, a default emission 
factor is being used to calculate the compliance obligations for unspecified 
electricity.208 The default emission factor used to determine compliance 
obligations for this electricity is calculated “using the Final WCI Default 
Emission Factor Calculator created by CPUC staff, vetted through the 
WCI Electricity Team, and adopted by the WCI Partners.”209 The default 
emission factor is the average emission rate of electricity from the marginal, 
unassigned facilities in the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
(WECC) area during 2006, 2007, and 2008.210 CARB defined marginal 
facilities “as facilities with capacity factors lower than 60 percent.”211  
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Marginal facilities are primarily gas-fired generators, although hydropower 
provides some marginal electricity as well in the WECC region.212 The 
default emission factor is initially set at 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh,
213 which is 
less than the average emission rate of a gas-fired facility, which is approxi-
mately 0.515 MTCO2e/MWh.
214 The compliance obligations for 
unspecified electricity are then calculated by multiplying the default emis-
sion factor and the MWhs imported.215 
In addition, importers from both specified and unspecified sources 
have compliance obligations for transmission losses.216 To account for 
transmission losses, specified sources have compliance obligations for the 
amount of electricity imported as measured at the generating facility’s 
busbar (i.e., prior to transmission across the grid).217 When the amount of 
imported electricity as measured at the busbar is unknown, or when the 
electricity is imported from an unspecified source, compliance obligations 
are increased by 2 percent to account for transmission line losses.218 
California provides some importers with an “RPS adjustment” to their 
compliance obligations when they import unspecified electricity from cer-
tain renewable energy generators in order to align the RPS and cap-and-
trade programs and reduce compliance costs.219 In order to qualify for an 
RPS adjustment, (1) the renewable electricity must not qualify as specified 
electricity (in that it must not be directly delivered); (2) the FJD must have 
contract or ownership rights to procure the electricity or must have a con-
tract to import the electricity on behalf of a party with such rights; (3) the 
RECs generated by the electricity must be used to comply with California’s 
RPS in the same year in which the electricity is imported; and (4) the 
electricity must be from one of the renewable generators that qualify under 
California’s RPS.220 While most renewable energy generators are eligible 
under California’s RPS, a substantial minority of renewable energy genera-
tors are excluded, including certain hydroelectric facilities.221 If the above 
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renewable generation are eligible, including “biomass, solar thermal, photovoltaic, wind, 
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requirements are met, the importer receives a compliance credit equal to 
the number of qualifying MWhs multiplied by the default emission fac-
tor.222 This basically means that the electricity is considered as coming from 
the renewable generator and is given its true emissions profile, rather than 
being treated as unspecified and assigned the default emission factor. This 
provision primarily applies to renewable electricity that must be firmed and 
shaped before being delivered to California, as that electricity is not direct-
ly delivered and therefore does not qualify as specified electricity.223 
In addition to imposing compliance obligations for the emissions asso-
ciated with imported electricity as discussed above, CARB specifically 
prohibits resource shuffling in the cap-and-trade regulations and requires 
importers to certify that they have not engaged in resource shuffling.224 
CARB has defined resource shuffling as “any plan, scheme, or artifice to 
receive credit based on emissions reductions that have not occurred, involv-
ing the delivery of electricity to the California grid.”225 California has 
indicated that this provision is intended to avoid three primary types of 
resource shuffling: (1) changing unspecified sources to specified sources 
only when a lower emission factor is obtained (“cherry picking”); (2) re-
placing purchases from high-emitting facilities with purchases from existing 
low-emitting facilities to obtain a lower emission factor (“facility swap-
ping”); and (3) changing a high-emission source from specified to 
unspecified to obtain a lower emission factor (“laundering”).226 The con-
tours of this prohibition are not yet clear, and stakeholders have requested 
that CARB develop a more concrete method of determining when a covered 
entity has engaged in resource shuffling. Given the complexity of the elec-
tricity market, there is constant shifting of resources that makes it difficult 
                                                                                                                      
geothermal, fuel cells using renewable fuels, small hydroelectric generation of 30 megawatts 
or less, digester gas, municipal solid waste conversion, landfill gas, ocean wave, ocean ther-
mal, or tidal current.” CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25741(a)(1) (West 2012). Large hydropower 
facilities are excluded under the definition, and there are further exceptions for small hydro-
power. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.12(e) (West 2012). 
 222. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(4)(c) (2012). 
 223. “Firming” is the process by which a backup generation source is used to supple-
ment the output of an intermittent resource to ensure that the total energy provided is 
sufficient to meet customer load. “Shaping” is the turning down of a supplemental genera-
tion source when the intermittent source is generating sufficient energy to meet customer 
load. SARA KAMINS & JACK STODDARD, CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA’S 
RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD (Apr. 2, 2008), available at ftp://ftp.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
oga/2010%20position%20letters/presentations/090402%20CPUC%20Presentation%20on%20
Renewable%20Energy%20Credits.pdf. 
 224. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(2) (2012). 
 225. Id. § 95802(a)(251).  
 226. CAL. AIR RES. BD., COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION FOR FIRST DELIVERERS OF 
ELECTRICITY 10 (2011), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/082011/ 
cap-trade-presentation.pdf [hereinafter COMPLIANCE OBLIGATION].  
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to determine when covered entities are intentionally shuffling resources for 
the primary purpose of avoiding compliance obligations. In response to 
pressure from stakeholders and a member of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), CARB suspended this prohibition for the first eight-
een months of trading to determine if it is necessary and to determine how 
to clearly define what actions constitute resource shuffling.227 
A simple example will help to illustrate how compliance obligations 
will vary among facilities under California’s program. Assume that we have 
three 100 MW-capacity facilities that continuously run at 50 percent ca-
pacity to generate 438,000 MWhs of electricity each year that is sold to 
meet California load: a solar facility, Solar, that emits 0 MTCO2e/MWh; a 
gas-fired facility, Gas, that emits 0.515 MTCO2e/MWh; and a coal facility, 
Coal, that emits 1.020 MTCO2e/MWh.
228 We also assume that compliance 
instruments cost $30 apiece229 and allow a facility to emit 1 MTCO2e. Solar 
will have no compliance obligations when it is located in-state or is a speci-
fied out-of-state source. If Solar is located out-of-state and is an unspecified 
source, it will be deemed to emit 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh, creating compli-
ance obligations that would cost approximately $5.6 million a year. Gas 
would have $6.8 million worth of compliance obligations when it is located 
in-state or is a specified out-of-state source, but it would have $5.6 million 
worth of compliance obligations if it is located out-of-state and is an un-
specified source. Coal would have $13.4 million worth of compliance 
obligations when it is located in-state or is a specified out-of-state source, 
but it would have only $5.6 million worth of compliance obligations if it is 
an out-of-state unspecified source. 
The decision to regulate imported electricity in this manner appears to 
be based on two main considerations: the difficulty of tracking imports to 
their source and the need to avoid leakage and resource shuffling. It may be 
practically impossible to track a large percentage of electricity imports back 
to the facilities from which they originated.230 Electricity is bought and sold 
                                                                                                                      
 227. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPENDIX A: WHAT IS RESOURCE SHUFFLING? 
(2012), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/appendix_a.pdf; Rory 
Carroll, California Suspends CO2 Market Rule on Electricity Imports, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2012, 
4:32 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/20/us-california-carbon-idUSBRE87 
J06B20120820. 
 228. Clean Energy, supra note 214.  
 229. While the auction reserve price is initially set at ten dollars per allowance, it is 
likely that demand will drive the price higher, especially in later years. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
17, § 95911(c)(1) (2012). The clearing price at the February 2013 auction for 2013 allowances 
was $13.62. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD QUARTERLY 
AUCTION 2, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/auction/ 
february_2013/auction2_feb2013_summary_results_report.pdf. 
 230. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20; MARKET 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-53 to -54. 
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many times on the wholesale electricity markets, and there is a great deal of 
anonymity involved in the transactions.231 CARB staff, New Jersey regula-
tors, and commentators considering options for preventing leakage have all 
concluded that it cannot be done effectively.232 If the electricity cannot be 
traced to a particular source, it is impossible to determine what emissions 
are associated with the electricity or whether the generating facility had 
annual emissions of 25,000 MTCO2e or more. It is important to note that 
there is no programmatic way to avoid this problem if imported electricity 
is to be regulated. Other approaches, including a carbon tax or a load-based 
approach, which would require load-serving entities (LSEs, which are basi-
cally utilities) to account for the emissions of their purchases,233 would also 
require that a default emission factor be applied to imported electricity. The 
LSE approach would, however, apply a default emission factor to both 
domestic and imported electricity.234 
California has not provided an exception for exported electricity in its 
cap-and-trade program, which means that exporters will face the same 
compliance obligations as intrastate sellers and similar compliance obliga-
tions to importers from specified sources. California is providing only a 
limited adjustment for exports when electricity is simultaneously imported 
and exported.235 In order to qualify, the importer and exporter must be the 
same entity and the purchase and sale must occur within the same hour.236 
If these requirements are met, then the importer/exporter is given a credit 
equal to the lowest quantity of imports or exports multiplied against the 
                                                                                                                      
 231. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20. 
 232. In re a Green House Gas Emission Portfolio Standard and Other Regulatory 
Mechanisms to Mitigate Leakage, No. EO08030150, 20–21 (N.J. Bd. o� Pub. Utils., Dec. 17, 
2008) (order), available at http://legalectric.org/f/2009/11/leakage-12-17-08-8i.pdf (“In a 
restructured electricity market like New Jersey, most e1ectricity purchases in the regional 
wholesale market do not specify the generation facility from which the electricity will be 
supplied. Even if the contract does identify a specific facility, the supplier will likely vary 
output from different facilities and even from different suppliers on the basis of the whole-
sale market economics to maximize financial returns.” This was in reference to a carbon 
adder, which requires a utility add a shadow price for the emissions associated with the 
electricity. If a carbon adder is too difficult to put in place, it is definitely not possible to get 
an accurate emissions estimate that can be used to impose compliance obligations); INITIAL 
STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-19 to -20; see also ALVARADO & GRIFFIN, supra 
note 175, at 30 (GHG emissions of unspecified sources must be estimated); MARKET 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 149, at H-53 to -55 (concluding 
that about half of imported electricity will need to be assigned a default emission factor); 
Bushnell, supra note 184, at 15 (concluding that imported electricity not connected to a 
contract would have to be assigned a default emission factor); PALMER, BURTRAW & PAUL, 
supra note 154, at 6–7 (same). 
 233. Bushnell, supra note 184, at 8–9. 
 234. Id. at 8–9, 13–14.  
 235. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(5) (2012). 
 236. Id. 
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lowest emission factor of any portion of the exports or imports.237 While 
this gives the importer/exporter some credit when there is essentially no 
import or export (because the net value of either imports or exports will be 
zero), the credit is designed to be the lowest possible. California therefore 
is not favoring its in-state generators to enhance their competitiveness in 
the interstate markets. 
In 2015, California will expand the cap-and-trade program to cover 
more entities and emissions.238 Importers from specified sources of electric-
ity will be subject to compliance obligations for all emissions associated 
with the imported electricity, even if the generating facility emits less than 
25,000 MTCO2e per year.
239 Additionally, the program will cover fuel 
suppliers when 25,000 MTCO2e would result from full combustion or 
oxidation of the quantities o� fuels that are imported or delivered to Cali-
fornia.240 California has chosen not to reduce the threshold for energy 
facilities located in California on the basis that they will be indirectly cov-
ered when fuel suppliers are regulated.241 
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: A BARRIER TO 
REGULATING INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from discriminating 
against, extraterritorially regulating, or unduly burdening interstate com-
merce. California is regulating both its domestic economy and goods that 
travel in interstate commerce under the cap-and-trade program, making a 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge likely. This Part explains the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine. 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause: Origin and Overview 
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall have [the p]ower . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among 
the several States.”242 The Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of 
power to Congress that does not expressly limit the power of states to 
regulate interstate commerce. However, the Supreme Court has long inter-
preted it to include such a limitation.243 This limitation, referred to as the 
                                                                                                                      
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. § 95812(d). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 62, at II-20. 
 242. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.  
 243. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 337 (2007); see also H.P. Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949). 
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dormant Commerce Clause,244 has been interpreted broadly245 but does not 
prohibit all state regulation of interstate commerce.246 Absent federal 
preemption, states have traditionally been allowed to exercise their police 
powers, including the power to regulate air quality and GHG emissions,247 
to “promot[e] the health and welfare” of their citizens.248 The question is 
what limits the dormant Commerce Clause places on otherwise legitimate 
exercises of state power. 
Courts have developed a complex analytical framework for determining 
when a state’s exercise of its police power violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause.249 A court will first determine whether the state law discriminates 
against interstate commerce250 or regulates activities beyond its borders 
(extraterritorially).251 A law discriminates against interstate commerce if it 
is facially discriminatory252 or if it is facially neutral but discriminatory in 
its purpose or effects.253 A state law falling into one of these categories is 
subjected to strict scrutiny that can only be overcome by a showing that the 
state has no less discriminatory means to advance a legitimate local pur-
pose.254 If the state law regulates in- and out-of-state activities 
evenhandedly, it is subjected to the Pike balancing test, which weighs the 
state interests involved against the burden placed on interstate com-
merce.255 These tests are discussed in more detail infra. 
B. The Policies Underlying the Dormant Commerce Clause 
In examining whether a state law violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause, it is helpful to understand the reasons why the doctrine was created. 
                                                                                                                      
 244. See United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 337. 
 245. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978) (“All objects of interstate 
trade merit [dormant] Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the 
outset.”). 
 246. Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 349–50 (1977); Huron Port-
land Cement Co. v. City o� Detroit, 360 U.S. 440, 442–43 (1960). 
 247. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519–20 (2007) (states can use their police 
power to reduce in-state GHG emissions unless there is an independent limitation on their 
ability to do so). 
 248. Huron, 360 U.S. at 442–43. 
 249. See Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25 
ENVTL. F. 50, 53–55 (describing the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). 
 250. See, e.g., Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. 
 251. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989). 
 252. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. 
 253. Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350–52 (1977). 
 254. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 338–39 (2007). 
 255. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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Two main policy rationales are used to justify its existence.256 The central 
rationale is the need to prevent the “evils of ‘economic isolation’ and protec-
tionism,” although the courts seek to do so without unduly hindering the 
ability of the states to manage local affairs and to “safeguard the health and 
safety of [their] people.”257 The Framers held “the conviction that in order 
to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward eco-
nomic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and 
later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”258 They be-
lieved that free trade among the states was critical to the nation’s success 
and wanted to limit the ability of states to create trade barriers to short-
sightedly protect their local economies at the expense of the nation’s  
economy as a whole.259 If one state implemented discriminatory laws, oth-
ers would likely retaliate by doing the same.260 
The Supreme Court has used this policy underpinning to justify strict 
limits on the power of states to burden or discriminate against interstate 
commerce,261 although not without sharp criticism from proponents of 
strong federalism and judicial deference to elected officials.262 In recent 
                                                                                                                      
 256. See Patricia Weisselberg, Comment, Shaping the Energy Future in the American West: 
Can California Curb Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Out-of-State, Coal-Fired Power Plants 
Without Violating the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 185, 207–08 (2007). 
 257. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623–24 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 
527 (1935)). 
 258. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979); see Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James 
Madison). The Framers apparently had good reason to fear divisive burdens on interstate 
commerce: the federal government had been unable to prevent discriminatory treatment, 
trade barriers, and ill will under the Articles of Confederation. Brannon P. Denning, Corre-
spondence, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: Prolegomenon to a Defense, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 1801, 1804–06 (2004). 
 259. H.P. Hood & Sons Co. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533–35 (1949); Weisselberg, 
supra note 256, at 207–08. “In one o� his letters, Madison wrote that the Commerce Clause 
‘grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the nonimporting, and 
was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States 
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General 
Government.’” W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (quoting 3 M. 
FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (1911)). 
 260. C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994). 
 261. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194–96 (striking down independently 
constitutional aspects of a state law that in combination formed a tax and subsidy scheme by 
taxing all milk sellers and using the proceeds to subsidize only in-state sellers). 
 262. See id. at 217 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The wisdom of a messianic insistence 
on a grim sink-or-swim policy o� laissez-faire economics would be debatable had Congress 
chosen to enact it; but Congress has done nothing of the kind. It is the Court which has 
imposed the policy under the dormant Commerce Clause, a policy which bodes ill for the 
values o� federalism which have long animated our constitutional jurisprudence.”); C & A 
Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 424–25 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“No more than the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Commerce Clause ‘does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics . . . 
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years, the resurgence o� federalism and the appointment of its proponents 
to the Court have led to a constriction of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine and an expansion of its exceptions.263 The Court has become more 
reluctant to substitute its economic judgments for those of elected state 
officials or otherwise interfere with their ability to further legitimate local 
ends.264 
The second main rationale for the dormant Commerce Clause is repre-
sentation reinforcement.265 When a state passes a law that affects its 
citizens, the elected officials responsible for the law can be held accountable 
by those citizens through the political process. They can lobby the officials 
to change the law or simply vote them out of office. As the Court has rec-
ognized, however, “when the regulation is of such a character that its 
burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is 
not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally 
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the 
state.”266 In many cases, one could expect those in-state interests capable o� 
holding elected officials accountable to actually encourage the passage o� 
laws that discriminatorily burden out-of-state competitors in order to en-
hance their ability to capture in-state market share.267 I� burdens on out-of-
state competitors were combined with benefits to in-state interests,268 a 
state could significantly advance the interests of in-state actors at the ex-
pense of the national economy and solidarity.  
                                                                                                                      
[or] embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire.’ The 
dormant Commerce Clause does not ‘protect the particular structure or methods of opera-
tion in a[ny] . . . market.’ The only right to compete that it protects is the right to compete 
on terms independent of one’s location.” (citations omitted) (quoting Lochner v. New York, 
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 263. Dep’t o� Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 345 (2008) (“the Framers’ distrust of 
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my”); see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 345 (2007) (creating a new exception allowing state entities to severely burden inter-
state commerce to reap benefits for themselves); Stephen M. Johnson, From Climate Change 
and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures?, 27 GA. 
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competition.”). 
 265. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989); Weisselberg, supra note 256, at 207–08. 
 266. S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938). 
 267. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 200–01. 
 268. See id. 
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C. State Laws That Discriminate Against Interstate Commerce 
The first step in dormant Commerce Clause analysis is to determine 
whether a state law discriminates against interstate commerce.269 As a 
threshold matter, the entities allegedly being treated differently must be 
similarly situated.270  
[I]n the absence of actual or prospective competition between the 
supposedly favored and disfavored entities in a single market there 
can be no local preference, whether by express discrimination 
against interstate commerce or undue burden upon it, to which the 
dormant Commerce Clause may apply. The dormant Commerce 
Clause protects markets and participants in markets, not taxpayers as 
such.271 
If the parties are similarly situated, the court proceeds to determine if 
the state law discriminates against the out-of-state parties. There are two 
primary categories of discriminatory state laws.272 First, there are facially 
discriminatory state laws that explicitly draw a distinction between in-state 
and out-of-state entities in order to subject them to different treatment, 
benefitting the former while burdening the latter.273  
Importantly, it does not matter at what point in the chain of commerce 
the discriminatory law intervenes: “For over 150 years, [the Supreme 
Court’s] cases have rightly concluded that the imposition of a differential 
burden on any part of the stream of commerce—from wholesaler to retailer 
to consumer—is invalid, because a burden placed at any point will result in 
a disadvantage to the out-of-state producer.”274 Nor does it matter if the 
discrimination is slight: “where discrimination is patent . . . neither a wide-
spread advantage to in-state interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-
of-state competitors need be shown.”275 However, “[t]he Commerce Clause 
                                                                                                                      
 269. Dep’t o� Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008). 
 270. Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town o� Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 582 n.16 (1997); 
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does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage 
in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the 
State’s regulation of interstate commerce.”276 
Second, there are facially neutral laws that discriminate against inter-
state commerce in their purpose277 or effects.278 The court assesses 
independently the purpose of the law; it is not bound by either legislative 
findings and declarations of purpose or determinations by state courts.279 
The court independently discerns the purpose from the statute as a whole, 
and “context is a critically important interpretive tool.”280 When consider-
ing whether a state law has discriminatory effects, the court assesses the 
law’s effects on in-state and out-of-state activities to determine if it favors 
in-state activities by raising the costs for out-of-state businesses dispropor-
tionately281 or by eliminating competitive advantages enjoyed by out-of-
state businesses as a result of their place of origin.282 Some courts have held 
that this competitive advantage can be that out-of-state parties are not 
subject to regulations that disadvantage in-state parties, at least if different 
laws provide and take away the advantage, such that elimination of the law 
removing the advantage would not also necessarily eliminate the law 
providing the advantage.283  
The result can be clear when the challenged law is alleged to have dis-
criminatory effects on interstate commerce.284 In Hunt v. Washington State 
                                                                                                                      
 276. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278. 
 277. There is some uncertainty regarding whether a protectionist purpose, without 
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alone will seldom, if ever, invalidate a tax that apart from its motives would be recognized as 
lawful”); Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2005) (“While courts 
often recite this test, there is some reason to question whether a showing of discriminatory 
purpose alone will invariably suffice to support a finding of constitutional invalidity under 
the dormant Commerce Clause.”) (citations omitted); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City o� 
Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1013 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“In no Commerce Clause case cited or 
disclosed by research has a statute or regulation been invalidated solely because of the 
legislators’ alleged discriminatory motives.”). A discriminatory purpose is still valuable for a 
party challenging a state law because, when combined with discriminatory effects, it brings 
the case more solidly within the protectionist conduct that the dormant Commerce Clause is 
intended to curtail. 
 278. See Gov’t Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1277–78 (1992). 
 279. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
 280. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 430 F.3d at 37. 
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Apple Advertising Commission, Washington apple growers challenged a North 
Carolina law that prohibited the use of state quality-grade labels on apples 
shipped into or sold in the state in closed containers.285 The Supreme 
Court held that this discriminated against Washington apple growers to the 
benefit o� North Carolina growers for three reasons.286 First, Washington 
growers had to develop special procedures for serving the North Carolina 
market because their apples were normally placed in containers already 
labeled with the Washington grade.287 Second, Washington growers had 
developed a reputable grading system that marked their apples as superior, 
giving them competitive and economic advantages that were eliminated by 
the law.288 Third, since consumers would no longer be able to differentiate 
between the apples, preventing labeling unfairly leveled the field for North 
Carolina growers by allowing their lower quality apples to compete with the 
higher quality Washington apples.289 While there was evidence of a dis-
criminatory purpose, such a purpose was not necessary to invalidate the 
law.290 
Other times the result is less clear but quite sensible. In Exxon Corp. v. 
Governor of Maryland, the Court upheld a Maryland law that prohibited 
petroleum producers or refiners from operating any retail gas stations in the 
state.291 At the time, “no petroleum products [were] produced or refined in 
Maryland,” meaning that the burden of the prohibition fell entirely on out-
of-state entities.292 The Court concluded that this was irrelevant because 
other out-of-state entities were still competing with in-state entities.293 
Absent proof of a shift of market share to in-state interests as a result of the 
law, there was no discrimination.294 
This result may be due in part to the level of generality at which the 
Court viewed the relevant classes o� businesses. At a high level, looking at 
the entities that wished to operate retail gasoline stations as a single class, 
the Maryland law appears discriminatory because it prohibited only out-of-
state entities from operating gas stations. However, when the class is 
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viewed at a low level of generality as consisting only of producers and 
refiners of petroleum, the law did not discriminate because no in-state 
members of that class were benefitted at the expense of the out-of-state 
members of that class. This makes sense: the dormant Commerce Clause 
protects markets and competition between similar classes of participants in 
markets rather than particular entities.295 Because other out-of-state entities 
were able to compete with local ones, it did not matter that a class of the 
potential competitors was eliminated, even though the class eliminated was 
arguably the most dangerous to in-state interests. 
An important but somewhat more complicated situation arises when 
the state develops a tax-and-subsidy scheme. In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. 
Healy, Massachusetts imposed a tax assessment on all milk sold to Massa-
chusetts retailers.296 The proceeds from this tax were then distributed to 
Massachusetts dairy farmers to subsidize their incomes and keep them in 
business because they could not profitably produce milk at the federally 
guaranteed minimum milk price.297 “The pricing order thus allow[ed] Mas-
sachusetts dairy farmers who produce at higher cost to sell at or below the 
price charged by lower cost out-of-state producers.”298 This effect was the 
admitted purpose of the law: “Regionally, the industry is in serious trouble 
and ultimately, a federal solution will be required. In the meantime, we 
must act on the state level to preserve our local industry.”299 
The Supreme Court had no trouble concluding that this was discrimi-
natory and striking down the law.300 The law had the same effect as a tariff, 
“ ‘neutraliz[ing] advantages belonging to the place of origin.’ ”301 In reaching 
its decision, the Court rejected several arguments advanced by Massachu-
setts.302 The most important argument that the State made was that because 
each part of the program—the state subsidy and the nondiscriminatory 
tax—was independently constitutional, the program as a whole must also be 
constitutional.303 “In effect, respondent argues, if the State may impose a 
valid tax on dealers, it is free to use the proceeds of the tax as it chooses; 
and if it may independently subsidize its farmers, it is free to finance the 
subsidy by means of any legitimate tax.”304 While a subsidy funded out of 
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the general fund is normally acceptable,305 the scheme established by Mas-
sachusetts was unconstitutional because it burdened out-of-state producers 
while benefitting in-state producers.306 The Court explained why this 
scheme was particularly dangerous: 
[W]hen a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to one of 
the groups hurt by the tax, a State’s political processes can no long-
er be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the 
in-state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has 
been mollified by the subsidy. So, in this case, one would ordinarily 
have expected at least three groups to lobby against the order pre-
mium, which, as a tax, raises the price (and hence lowers demand) 
for milk: dairy farmers, milk dealers, and consumers. But because 
the tax was coupled with a subsidy, one of the most powerful of 
these groups, Massachusetts dairy farmers, instead of exerting their 
influence against the tax, were in fact its primary supporters.307 
If the court determines that a law is discriminatory, it is subjected to 
strict scrutiny and a virtually per se rule of invalidity.308 The burden shifts 
to the State to show that the law “advances a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives.”309 The Court has commented that “[t]his is perhaps just another way 
of saying that what may appear to be a ‘discriminatory’ provision in the 
constitutionally prohibited sense—that is, a protectionist enactment—may 
on closer analysis not be so. However it be put, the standards for such 
justification are high.”310  
It appears that only one discriminatory state law has ever been upheld 
by the Supreme Court under this test, illustrating how important it is for 
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states to avoid having their laws characterized as discriminatory.311 In 
Maine v. Taylor, Maine passed a discriminatory law banning the importa-
tion o� baitfish.312 To justify the ban, Maine argued that the importation o� 
baitfish could introduce harmful, non-native fish parasites and invasive 
species.313 Maine further argued that this legitimate local purpose could not 
be achieved by anything less than a complete ban because there were no 
effective testing procedures for parasites and no way to sift through imports 
to remove invasive species.314  
In response, the challenger argued that Maine did not have a legitimate 
local purpose because there was insufficient evidence that the parasites were 
harmful and there was no risk from invasive species because modern bait-
fish hatcheries were able to prevent contamination of their stocks.315 The 
challenger also argued that there were less discriminatory alternatives be-
cause Maine could employ inspection techniques to prevent introduction of 
parasites or invasive species, as it had with other types o� fish.316 It could 
also have limited which out-of-state hatcheries were authorized to sell bait-
fish into Maine.317  
The evidence in the district court was not unequivocal, but the district 
court concluded that Maine’s evidence carried the day: 
First, the court found that Maine ‘clearly has a legitimate and sub-
stantial purpose in prohibiting the importation o� live bait fish,’ 
because ‘substantial uncertainties’ surrounded the effects that bait-
fish parasites would have on the State’s unique population of wild 
fish, and the consequences of introducing nonnative species were 
similarly unpredictable. Second, the court concluded that less dis-
criminatory means of protecting against these threats were 
currently unavailable, and that, in particular, testing procedures for 
baitfish parasites had not yet been devised. Even if procedures of 
this sort could be effective, the court found that their development 
probably would take a considerable amount of time.318 
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The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s findings accepting Maine’s 
evidence and its conclusion that Maine had met the test.319 
Two aspects of the case support Maine’s argument that it had no less 
discriminatory alternatives. First, it looked doubtful whether the hatchery 
techniques that the challenger claimed were safe actually worked, as his 
intercepted shipment had at least two of the three types of parasites and a 
variety of invasive species.320 Second, significant practical difficulties ac-
companied inspection: it would be difficult to accomplish before the  
baitfish perished, and it was reliant on random sampling, as the fish had to 
be killed to be inspected, that did not guarantee that a shipment was free of 
parasites or invasive species.321  
Critically, however, Maine had been using inspections instead o� bans 
to control similar problems with other freshwater fish imports, potentially 
giving Maine a less discriminatory alternative if it could develop sufficient 
inspections for baitfish.322 Indeed, this was the grounds on which the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated the law.323 Ultimately, the case 
turned on the current unavailability of the inspection and testing proce-
dures necessary to prevent the introduction of parasites and invasive 
species.324 The Supreme Court agreed: 
[T]he “abstract possibility” of developing acceptable testing proce-
dures, particularly when there is no assurance as to their 
effectiveness, does not make those procedures an “[available] . . . 
nondiscriminatory [alternative]” . . . . A State must make reasona-
ble efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its 
borders, but it is not required to develop new and unproven means 
of protection at an uncertain cost.325 
Thus, a state must have currently available nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives, or possibly easily developed alternatives that are relatively certain to 
work before it will fail the test,326 and, as in other contexts, the findings o� 
fact of the district court may be outcome determinative. 
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D. State Laws That Regulate Activities Beyond State Borders 
The dormant Commerce Clause also prohibits state laws that attempt 
to regulate beyond a state’s borders, which courts refer to as either direct 
regulation of interstate commerce or extraterritorial regulation,327 although 
courts have recently expressed skepticism about the continued vitality of 
this doctrine.328 If a court determines that a law regulates extraterritorially, 
the law is struck down without further inquiry.329 The guiding principles 
for this analysis “reflect the Constitution’s special concern both with the 
maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed 
limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual 
States within their respective spheres.”330  
The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test for determining 
when a state law regulates extraterritorially.331 “First, the ‘Commerce 
Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that 
takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the com-
merce has effects within the State.’”332 Second, a state law that has the 
practical effect of controlling commerce that occurs completely outside a 
state’s boundaries is invalid, regardless of whether the legislature intended 
the law to have an extraterritorial reach.333 Third, the court must consider 
whether the state law interferes with the legitimate regulations of other 
states and what the effect would be if other states adopted similar laws.334 A 
party usually “must either present evidence that conflicting, legitimate 
legislation is already in place or that the threat of such legislation is both 
actual and imminent.”335  
As a general matter, “the Commerce Clause protects against incon-
sistent legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime 
into the jurisdiction of another State. And, specifically, the Commerce 
Clause dictates that no State may force an out-of-state merchant to seek 
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regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in  
another.”336 An important point to keep in mind is that states frequently 
exert regulatory effects outside their borders: the question is not if there is 
an extraterritorial effect, but rather if an extraterritorial effect of the law 
goes too far.337 If the extraterritorial effects are incidental, their burdens on 
interstate commerce are assessed under the more lenient Pike balancing 
test,338 which is discussed in Part II.E infra. 
An early case that emphasizes one of the primary concerns of the Su-
preme Court is Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. In Baldwin, the Court struck 
down a New York law that required all milk sold in the state to have been 
purchased from the producer at or above a minimum price set by the 
state.339 When applied to milk produced in Vermont, it eliminated the 
ability o� Vermont milk producers to use their lower production costs to sell 
their milk more cheaply than New York milk producers.340 The Court 
struck down the law: New York could not protect its producers through the 
use of a law that had the practical effect of controlling commerce that oc-
curred completely outside the state’s boundaries.341 
Healy v. Beer Institute is representative of the Supreme Court’s limited 
recent jurisprudence in this area. In Healy, the Court struck down a Con-
necticut law that required out-of-state beer importers to charge prices in 
Connecticut that were at or below the prices they charged in any of Con-
necticut’s bordering states.342 In determining the effective price being 
charged in other states, Connecticut subtracted from the reported price the 
value of any promotions, discounts, or rebates.343 At the time, Massachu-
setts had a law that required beer importers to post a price that would 
remain in effect for a month, and New York had a law that required promo-
tional offers to remain available for 180 days.344 Thus, beer importers had to 
consider Connecticut’s law when deciding what price to charge in Massa-
                                                                                                                      
 336. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336–37 (citation omitted). 
 337. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 26–30 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Whatever the pre-
sent scope of the extraterritoriality doctrine, it clearly does not require per se invalidation of 
all extraterritorial applications contained within state statutes regulating commerce.”), 
vacated sub nom. IMS Health, Inc. v. Schneider, 131 S.Ct. 3091 (2011). The court noted that 
“[s]ome circuits have simply framed the [extraterritoriality] doctrine in terms of concerns 
with preventing economic protectionism or inconsistent regulatory regimes, or have sug-
gested that the Court’s cases do not dictate ‘the notion that direct and facial regulation of 
extraterritorial transactions is absolutely banned.’” Id. at 29 n.28 (citations omitted) (quoting 
Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 336 F.3d 545, 547–50 (7th Cir. 2003)).  
 338. S.D. Myers, 253 F.3d at 471–72. 
 339. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 519 (1935). 
 340. Id. at 521–22. 
 341. Id. at 522. 
 342. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326–27 (1989). 
 343. Id. at 327. 
 344. Id. at 327–28. 
     
Fall 2013] The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program 133 
chusetts and what promotions to offer in New York, as those actions would 
set a ceiling on what they could charge in Connecticut for the aforemen-
tioned durations.345 The same was true of volume discounts, as 
Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island allowed them but Connecticut 
did not, meaning that Connecticut prices would be set at the lowest amount 
charged in other states, even i� high volumes were required to obtain those 
prices in the other states.346  
The Court concluded that the law had an extraterritorial effect because 
it required importers to forego competitive advantages and markets in other 
states and effectively set prices in other states.347 “States may not deprive 
businesses and consumers in other States of ‘whatever competitive ad-
vantages they may possess’ based on the conditions of the local market.”348 
Additionally, there could have been significant problems on a national scale 
if other states had implemented similar laws, amounting to regulation o� 
beer prices in a way that only the federal government is authorized to do.349 
E. State Laws That Impose Nondiscriminatory Burdens on Interstate 
Commerce 
If a state law avoids being characterized as discriminatory, it will be as-
sessed under the Pike balancing test.350 The test is quite lenient: “Where the 
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be 
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”351 The burden tolerated depends on 
the importance of the state interest and on whether that interest could be 
promoted with less impact on interstate commerce.352 This test requires a 
court to make three fairly subjective inquiries: (1) whether the state’s inter-
est is legitimate; (2) whether the burden on interstate commerce is clearly 
excessive compared to the state interest; and (3) whether there are any less 
burdensome alternatives.353 “State laws frequently survive this Pike scruti-
ny,”354 although its result is difficult to predict and very fact specific.355 
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Given the subjective nature of the inquiry and the lack of analogous cases, 
an extensive review of the case law is unnecessary.  
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., a Minnesota law “banning the 
retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but 
permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such 
as paperboard milk cartons” was upheld by the Court.356 The purpose of the 
law was to reduce waste problems, conserve energy, and stop depletion of 
natural resources, although opponents in the legislature presented a great 
deal of evidence tending to show that the law would merely increase the 
price of milk without yielding any of the purported benefits.357 After chas-
tising the state courts for invalidating the law on equal protection grounds 
because the means chosen were not rationally related to the ends sought, 
the Supreme Court noted that “it is not the function of the courts to substi-
tute their evaluation o� legislative facts for that of the legislature.”358 This 
matters for the dormant Commerce Clause analysis because the Court then 
proceeded to weigh what the state was trying to achieve rather than what the 
state was likely to achieve against the burdens on interstate commerce.359  
After deciding that environmental protection and resource conservation 
are legitimate state interests, the court upheld the law because it still al-
lowed milk to move freely across state lines and there was insufficient 
evidence that in-state businesses would be benefitted any more than out-of-
state ones as nonplastic alternatives began to be used.360 Even granting a 
differential burden that benefitted in-state pulp manufacturers, the state’s 
alternatives were “either more burdensome on commerce” (requiring re-
turnable containers) “or less likely to be effective (as, for example, 
providing incentives for recycling).”361 
F. Limiting Doctrines on the Dormant Commerce Clause 
There are three primary limitations on the dormant Commerce Clause: 
the compensatory tax doctrine, the market participant exception, and the 
public entity exception. Only the last is applicable to California’s regula-
tions. 
The compensatory tax doctrine allows states to assess taxes that dis-
criminate against interstate commerce when the taxes are compensatory in 
nature (i.e., when the tax is necessary to equalize the tax burden on inter-
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state and intrastate commerce).362 The doctrine simply recognizes that 
states should be able to apply equivalent burdens on intrastate and inter-
state commerce.363 “ ‘It was not the purpose of the [C]ommerce [C]lause to 
relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state 
tax burden[s].’ ”364 The compensatory tax doctrine is not helpful for Cali-
fornia because the same event, delivery of electricity to the grid, is being 
taxed for both in-state and out-of-state sellers of electricity. That is, out-of-
state sellers are subject to the same tax as in-state sellers, rather than a 
“compensatory” tax. Even if the taxes on in- and out-of-state parties are 
viewed separately, the traditional discrimination analysis applies to com-
pensatory taxes, such that this doctrine does not help California. 
The market participant exception allows state and local governments to 
discriminate against interstate commerce when they act as market partici-
pants by purchasing or selling, rather than acting as market regulators.365 If 
this exception is established, then the law is evaluated under the Pike bal-
ancing test.366 Unless California, or another state attempting to regulate 
imported electricity, is willing to go into the electricity business,367 this 
exception is o� little use. California would be regulating the sale of electrici-
ty rather than actually purchasing or selling it. While the state is selling a 
permit to pollute, allowing this exception to apply to cap-and-trade pro-
grams would allow it to apply to a wide variety of regulatory regimes and 
would largely swallow the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 
The public entity exception allows state and local governments to pass 
laws that discriminate against or burden interstate commerce but benefit 
only themselves.368 Governments are responsible for protecting the health 
and welfare of their people, and the dormant Commerce Clause does not 
limit the ability of governments to meet the needs of their people them-
selves.369 Laws must treat all private parties the same to qualify for this 
exception, though.370 If the exception is established, the law at issue is  
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assessed under the Pike balancing test.371 Because California is regulating 
both independently and publicly owned generators, this exception may help 
California. 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA’S CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAM UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE  
Now that we have discussed California’s stake in abating climate 
change, its cap-and-trade program, and the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine, we reach the task at hand. This Part analyzes the provisions and 
aspects of California’s cap-and-trade program that make the program vul-
nerable to challenge and invalidation under the dormant Commerce Clause. 
In addition to analyzing the program as designed, I suggest refinements 
that could improve the chances of surviving a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge. 
A. If California’s Program Discriminates Against Interstate Commerce, 
Can It Survive Strict Scrutiny? 
This section analyzes the provisions of California’s cap-and-trade pro-
gram that might be considered discriminatory and assesses potentially 
discriminatory provisions under strict scrutiny. There are quite a few po-
tential vulnerabilities in the cap-and-trade program. While the analysis that 
follows applies to the California cap-and-trade program, it is also intended 
to provide guidance to regulators in other states implementing cap-and-
trade programs. 
1. The Legislative and Regulatory Purpose Behind the Program 
Courts often recite the rule that a discriminatory purpose is sufficient 
to invoke strict scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. While no 
case has apparently invalidated a state law on this basis,372 state regulators 
must be careful to avoid the appearance o� favoring intrastate commerce 
over interstate commerce. If it appears that a state is attempting to gain a 
competitive edge for its businesses through regulation, courts are likely to 
scrutinize the regulation more closely and are more likely to invalidate it. 
California does not appear to have a discriminatory purpose, although 
there are parts of the legislative and regulatory history that could be con-
strued as evincing a desire to gain an undue competitive advantage. First, 
AB 32 requires that CARB develop the regulations to “maximize the total 
benefits to California” and prevent leakage of California businesses and 
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market share to other jurisdictions to the greatest extent possible.373 Sec-
ond, language in the cap-and-trade program regulatory history indicates 
that CARB is adopting policies in part to keep industries from leaving 
California.374 These statements are protectionist in one sense: California 
wants to keep industries in California. The point, however, is not to protect 
California industries from normal competition. Rather, the point is to apply 
the cap-and-trade program as fairly as possible to in- and out-of-state busi-
nesses. No discrimination against interstate commerce is necessary to stop 
leakage: mere equal treatment is sufficient.375 I� leakage occurs, it is because 
out-of-state businesses are taking advantage of reduced compliance obliga-
tions. Additionally, preventing leakage is vital to achieving real reductions 
of GHG emissions. Leakage artificially meets the cap and reduces Califor-
nia’s ability to meet targeted emissions reductions. Finally, while California 
seeks to maximize the benefits it receives, this does not indicate that Cali-
fornia is seeking to obtain benefits through discrimination against interstate 
commerce. There are many non-discriminatory benefits that California can 
obtain, such as improved air quality, better energy efficiency, and increased 
tax revenue. Thus, the legislative and regulatory history does not indicate 
that California has a protectionist purpose behind the creation or imple-
mentation of the cap-and-trade program. 
It is also helpful to keep the bigger picture in mind. California’s cap-
and-trade program is just one of many steps California is taking to reduce 
GHG emissions. California has implemented one of the highest RPSs in 
the country,376 an emission standard for new power plants,377 and a low 
carbon fuel standard,378 as well as other measures to reduce GHG emis-
sions.379 While these programs yield many benefits, they are costly to 
California and its citizens. California’s comprehensive approach to reducing 
GHG emissions and continued resolve in the face of challenges and costs 
weigh strongly against finding a discriminatory purpose. 
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2. The Direct Allocation of Allowances to In-State Industry 
California is directly allocating allowances to almost all of the indus-
tries in the state (aside from the electricity sector), although there is 
substantial variation in how many allowances each industry will be allocat-
ed.380 This is essentially a subsidy that reduces compliance costs for  
California businesses under the cap-and-trade program. While out-of-state 
businesses are not receiving this subsidy, they are not subject to the cap-
and-trade regulations. As such, this is a pure subsidy situation, and the 
Court has made clear that states are free to subsidize their businesses with-
out violating the dormant Commerce Clause.381 
3. The Use of a Default Emission Factor to Calculate Compliance 
Obligations for Unspecified Imported Electricity 
California has chosen to use a default emission factor to regulate elec-
tricity from unspecified out-of-state sources but has chosen to use actual 
emissions to regulate electricity from in-state and specified out-of-state 
sources. This is one of the most critical aspects of the program, and it will 
unfortunately be one of the hardest for California to defend from dormant 
Commerce Clause scrutiny because out-of-state and in-state electricity are 
being treated differently. There are two distinct issues arising from Cali-
fornia’s use of a default emission factor to calculate compliance obligations 
for importers but not for in-state generators: (1) whether an average (the 
default emission factor) can be used at all without being uniformly applied 
to all sources of electricity; and (2) whether the default emission factor 
chosen by California is discriminatory, assuming that California can use a 
default emission factor.  
a. The Use of a Default Emission Factor Only for Out-of-State 
Electricity  
i. Permissibility of Using an Average to Regulate 
We now turn to the first issue, which is whether an average can be used 
at all without being uniformly applied to all sources of electricity. This can 
be further unpacked into two separate issues: (1) whether using an average 
to calculate the compliance obligations of importers is discriminatory re-
gardless of whether an average is also used for in-state generators, and (2) 
whether, if an average is a permissible method of regulation, using an aver-
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age only for out-of-state generators is discriminatory. These are addressed 
in turn. 
The Supreme Court does not appear to have decided a case in which 
the use of an average was absolutely necessary, as it is here because Califor-
nia needs to charge regulated entities different fees for different production 
processes that create an identical product but is unable to calculate individ-
ualized fees for each regulated entity. The Court has, however, decided a 
case involving an attempt to justify the unnecessary use of an average under 
the compensatory tax doctrine.382 While it was a compensatory tax doctrine 
case, the discrimination analysis is the same as under the traditional test in 
the sense that interstate commerce cannot be taxed more heavily than intra-
state commerce.383  
In Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, Missouri imposed a use 
tax of 1.5% on goods purchased outside but used within the state.384 This 
tax was intended to compensate for local sales taxes, which varied in 
amount throughout the over 1000 localities of the state that had adopted 
them.385 Missouri argued that, when averaged, the burden on in-state goods 
was much higher than the burden on out-of-state goods.386 Indeed, the 
Missouri Supreme Court had concluded, based upon the stipulations of the 
parties, that while 53.5% o� localities had sales taxes below 1.5%, over 93% 
of the dollar volume of sales occurred in localities with sales taxes that were 
higher than 1.5%.387 This means that the weighted “average” of the local 
sales taxes actually imposed was higher than the 1.5% use tax.388 The Court 
characterized the argument based on these facts unfavorably: 
Respondents’ theory assumes that discrimination in some parts of a 
state tax system may be permissible under the Commerce Clause as 
long as it is of a sufficiently limited magnitude to be offset by pref-
erential treatment for interstate trade in other portions of the tax 
scheme. There is no question that, within a locality where the use 
tax exceeds the sales tax, the tax structure discriminates against in-
terstate trade. Respondents merely argue that the local jurisdiction 
provides too narrow a framework for proper constitutional analy-
sis.389 
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The Court rejected the use of an average and held that the tax was dis-
criminatory because out-of-state goods were taxed more heavily than in-
state goods in some localities.390 In doing so, it further disparaged the use 
of an average and overruled a prior case employing the use of an average in 
a very similar situation: “the General American approach to averaging bur-
dens on interstate and intrastate commerce, which Chief Justice Robertson 
[of the Supreme Court o� Missouri] aptly characterized as a rule of ‘ “close 
enough for government work,” ’ never took root in our Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.”391 The Court went on to state that:  
We have never suggested, however, that patent discrimination in 
part of the operation of a tax scheme, not directly justified under 
any theory such as the compensatory tax doctrine, can be rendered 
inconsequential for Commerce Clause purposes by advantages giv-
en to interstate commerce in other facets of a tax plan or in other 
regions of a State. On the contrary, as a general matter we have reject-
ed reliance on any calculus that requires a quantification of 
discrimination as a preliminary step to determining whether the discrimi-
nation is valid. Under our cases, unless one of several narrow bases 
of justification is shown, actual discrimination, wherever it is 
found, is impermissible, and the magnitude and scope of the dis-
crimination have no bearing on the determinative question whether 
discrimination has occurred.392 
The italicized text, at first blush, seems to indicate an unwillingness to 
weigh the overall effects of a regulatory tax scheme instead of simply pick-
ing out a part that is, when taken alone, apparently discriminatory. The 
hypertechnical approach suggested by the Court is untethered to any ra-
tional ends—if the burden on interstate commerce is lower than the burden 
on intrastate commerce, there is no discrimination, even if there might 
appear to be discrimination on the face of the statute. Read in context, 
though, the Court seems to merely be stating the usual rule that no quanti-
fication will be used when the relative burdens on interstate and intrastate 
commerce can be directly ascertained from the law. That is, there is no de 
minimis exception for discrimination. While the Court incorrectly applied 
that rule in this case because there was no actual discrimination overall, it 
does not follow that no quantification will be used when a unique situation 
arises in which there is no rational way to determine whether a law is dis-
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criminatory without initially quantifying the relative burdens. The fact that 
judges have to do a little math should not automatically make a law invalid.  
While this case is likely to be relied upon by challengers, it is distin-
guishable. First, an average appears to be absolutely necessary to regulate 
imported electricity from unspecified sources, whereas an average was not 
necessary in Lohman. Given this reality, which does not appear to have been 
present in any other case decided by the Court, there should be more flexi-
bility in the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine than the formalistic rule 
applied when averages are unnecessary. The purpose of the doctrine should 
be the guiding principle, which is preventing actual discrimination against 
out-of-state parties,393 not innovative state regulation. 
Second, the Court relied heavily on the fact that there were discrete lo-
calities in which in-state goods were taxed at a lower rate than out-of-state 
goods, and the Court only invalidated the tax as to those localities.394 That 
is a straightforward application of the traditional doctrine, without the need 
to make any judgments about the use of an average when necessary. Bene-
fits to and burdens on out-of-state parties spread over different 
geographically distinct markets is much less connected than benefit and 
burden spread within the same market, as is the case with California’s use of 
a default emission factor to determine the compliance obligations of im-
porters of unspecified electricity. When there are different geographically 
distinct markets, the use of an average will give in-state businesses an ad-
vantage in some markets and out-of-state businesses an advantage in other 
markets. Looking at each individual market, there is clear discrimination in 
some of those markets, even if there is no real discrimination in the aggre-
gate. On the other hand, when an average is applied to a single market, the 
only effect is a change in which out-of-state businesses in that market are 
more competitive, rather than a shift in market share from out-of-state 
businesses to in-state businesses (at least if the average is accurate). While 
courts are quick to state that a law favoring in-state businesses is not saved 
because some in-state businesses are burdened or some out-of-state busi-
nesses are benefitted, there logically must still be an aggregate benefit to  
in-state interests for the law to be discriminatory. Otherwise there is no  
rational reason to apply the dormant Commerce Clause, as the state is not 
benefitting itself at the expense of other states.  
Third, Lohman is distinguishable on the basis that the different taxes at 
issue in that case were not part of a single regulatory program but instead 
were numerous independent laws enacted by different levels of govern-
ment.395 Allowing multiple independent and unconnected laws, especially 
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ones enacted by different levels of government, to be aggregated in order to 
determine whether there is general discrimination across all of the laws 
would likely prove unworkable in practice or dilute the dormant Commerce 
Clause protections too much. States would attempt to justify discrimination 
by pointing to other, potentially many, different regulations that have some 
benefit to out-of-state parties and then ask the courts to compare all of the 
different benefits and burdens. That would create very difficult line-
drawing problems concerning how connected the benefit and burden need 
to be. This problem is avoided by requiring that the same regulatory  
program create the burden and benefit for the two to be weighed, as is the 
case here. 
The Court has not yet decided the narrower question that we must ad-
dress here: How should an average regulatory fee that benefits some and 
burdens other out-of-state parties relative to their in-state peers in the same 
market be treated? That is, it is clear that out-of-state parties cannot be 
burdened in some geographic areas and benefitted in others, but can one 
subclass of out-of-state parties, such as importers who purchase mostly coal 
or natural gas generation, be benefitted to the same degree that another 
subclass, such as importers purchasing mostly renewable generation, is 
burdened in the same market and by the same regulatory provision? On one 
hand, cases like Oregon Waste Systems v. Department of Environmental Quality 
show no tolerance for any higher charge on interstate commerce, however 
inconsequential.396 In these cases, though, no out-of-state party was placed 
in a better position than its in-state peers as a result o� how a tax or fee was 
calculated or a regulation was structured. The fee or regulation was categor-
ically more onerous for out-of-state parties. 
On the other hand, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland makes clear 
that states can burden one class of out-of-state competitors as long as there 
are others that can compete on equal terms with in-state business.397 The 
Maryland law seemed facially discriminatory because, as there were no 
producers or refiners of petroleum in the state, it could only be applied to 
out-of-state businesses.398 The law was saved because other out-of-state 
businesses were competing with the in-state businesses, and the prohibition 
probably benefitted those out-of-state businesses as much as it benefitted 
the in-state ones.399 There was no evidence that the law caused a shift of 
market share to in-state entities.400 If we think of marketers purchasing 
different generation types as representing the different types o� businesses 
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that wanted to operate retail gas stations in Exxon, the analogy indicates 
that certain marketers can be discriminated against as long as there is no 
overall discrimination against out-of-state parties that benefits in-state 
parties.  
Perhaps the rule to be distilled from these cases is that any subclass of 
out-of-state businesses can be burdened as long as another subclass of out-
of-state businesses is benefitted and there is no shift of market share to in-
state businesses as a result of the law. Under this rule, such a law shifting 
economic advantage among subclasses of competitors is not deemed dis-
criminatory. Under this rule, California can argue that because importing 
marketers are both benefitted and burdened in the same market, its  
regulation is not discriminatory. Under the 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh default 
emission factor contemplated by CARB, importing marketers who buy 
unspecified electricity primarily from coal generation will face less than 
half the compliance costs that they would if they were located in California, 
but importing marketers who buy electricity primarily from renewable 
generation, including nuclear, will face substantial compliance costs that 
they would not be liable for if they were located in California. It is im-
portant to note that the default emission factor is low, as it is substantially 
lower than the average emission rate of a gas-fired plant, which is approxi-
mately 0.515 MTCO2e/MWh.
401 
Instead of a comparison of the effects of the regulation on individual 
in-state and out-of-state marketers, California can argue that there must be 
a comparison between the regulation’s effects on the intrastate and inter-
state electricity markets as a whole. The Commerce “Clause protects the 
interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from prohibitive or bur-
densome regulations.”402 While this is a good argument and holds true to 
the purpose behind the dormant Commerce Clause, a court would likely be 
hesitant to rely on it. The use of an average, given its imprecision, most 
likely must survive strict scrutiny because thorough analysis is likely neces-
sary to determine whether an average is discriminatory or not.  
The second sub-issue is whether California must apply a default emis-
sion factor to in-state electricity if it applies one to out-of-state electricity. 
It is difficult to determine whether this would be required. It is likely that 
strict scrutiny will be used to assess California’s decision to use actual emis-
sions to determine the compliance obligations of in-state businesses while 
applying a default emission factor to determine the compliance obligations 
of out-of-state businesses. 
Shortly before publication of this Article, the Ninth Circuit decided 
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, which involves a dormant  
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Commerce Clause challenge to California’s low carbon fuel standard 
(LCFS).403 The LCFS uses a lifecycle analysis, which involves considera-
tion of all aspects of production, refining, and transportation of a fuel, to 
determine and assign a GHG intensity to transportation fuels, including 
ethanol.404 Importantly, the LCFS initially assigns an emission intensity 
using default lifecycle pathways.405 Default lifecycle pathways are common 
lifecycles for each fuel that use average emission values for each part of the 
lifecycle to obtain an overall average emission intensity for a fuel produced 
and delivered generally in line with the applicable default lifecycle path-
way.406 Regulated parties are given the ability to request a modification to 
one or more of the average values in a default pathway or to submit an 
individualized pathway under certain circumstances.407  
While the district court struck down the LCFS on the basis that it was 
facially discriminatory, the Ninth Circuit panel, by a two-to-one vote, re-
versed the district court.408 By holding that the use of default emission 
pathways is not facially discriminatory, the Ninth Circuit has provided 
support for the permissibility of using average values to regulate in certain 
circumstances, at least when “based on scientific data” rather than an “un-
grounded presumption that unfairly prejudices out-of-state” parties.409 
However, given the district court’s initial ruling and the dissent on appeal, 
it is unclear whether this decision will be endorsed by the Supreme Court, 
other circuits, or even other Ninth Circuit panels, or extended to more 
complicated situations like California’s cap-and-trade program. It is im-
portant to note that California is using default lifecycle pathways, and 
therefore average values, to regulate both in- and out-of-state entities, 
meaning the court did not address whether California must use average 
values for both in- and out-of-state entities if it uses average values for 
either in-state or out-of-state entities. 
The analysis presented in this Article demonstrates that the use an av-
erage in California’s cap-and-trade program is even more justifiable than 
the use of average values in the LCFS. While the use of average values in 
the LCFS is strongly supported by the analysis in this Article above, Cali-
fornia could use solely individualized pathways to assign emission values in 
the LCFS—a point relied on by the dissent.410 As discussed in this Article, 
California cannot assign individualized GHG emission values in the cap-
                                                                                                                      
 403.  Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 404. Id. at 1080–82. 
 405. Id. at 1081–82. 
 406. Id. at 1082. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at 1089, 1093–96. 
 409. Id. at 1089. 
 410. Id. at 1108–11. 
     
Fall 2013] The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program 145 
and-trade program because it is not possible to trace a significant portion of 
out-of-state electricity back to individual generators.411 
ii. Strict Scrutiny of the Decision to Use an Average 
As discussed above, California’s decisions to use a default emission fac-
tor and to apply the default emission factor only to imported electricity will 
likely be reviewed under strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, the State 
must show that its regulation “advances a legitimate local purpose that 
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives.”412 California is regulating GHG emissions to mitigate climate 
change, which is clearly a legitimate local purpose and has been recognized 
as such by the Supreme Court.413 California has a strong interest in abating 
climate change because it will face severe impacts from climate change in 
both the short and long term. Climate change is predicted to have wide-
ranging consequences: a decrease in annual precipitation and snowpack that 
will result in severe water shortages, an increase in the number and size of 
summer wildfires, an increase in sea levels that threatens hundreds of thou-
sands of people and property worth tens o� billions of dollars, an increase 
in tidal erosion that may result in a loss o� forty-one square miles of Cali-
fornia’s coast, a decrease in air quality that will eliminate all projected 
improvements through 2050, a decrease in public health generally, an in-
crease in energy use, and a decrease in environmental quality and 
services.414 In addition to the weighty harms that cannot be easily mone-
tized, these effects are estimated to cost California billions of dollars 
annually over the course of the next century. California has a strong local 
interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, preventing 
reduction of its sovereign territory, reducing burdens on the public fisc, and 
preserving its environment.  
There is, however, uncertainty inherent in any forward-looking predic-
tions, especially predictions involving a phenomenon as complex as climate 
change. No one can be certain that reducing GHG emissions will avert the 
worst impacts of climate change or that the predicted impacts will even 
occur,415 although we already appear to be experiencing substantial  
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warming.416 Unfortunately, we do not live in a world of perfect information. 
The studies that have been undertaken to predict the impacts of climate 
change represent the best that science can currently do. Even if there is 
uncertainty in the predicted effects of climate change, those predictions are 
staggering. Trying to limit the chances of such impacts alone should be 
given much weight. Few things are certain. Legislatures and governments 
must rely on the best information available to determine their policies and 
protect their people. 
In an attempt to reduce the predicted impacts of climate change, Cali-
fornia has created a cap-and-trade program that reduces the GHG 
emissions associated with its in-state activities and electricity use. While 
California is but one actor in a global problem, its economy is the sixth 
largest in the world417 and its GHG emissions are the twelfth highest in the 
world.418 Significant reductions in California’s GHG emissions matter, even 
if those reductions are not enough to stop global climate change alone. It is 
important to note that stopping global climate change is all but impossible: 
it is already happening. Rather, what states and countries are achieving is 
incremental reduction in the intensity and consequences of climate change. 
Reduction of GHG emissions translates into milder climate change. These 
reductions take on added importance when one considers that climate 
change may be non-linear—meaning that added emissions may have an 
exponential effect on the climate once a tipping point is reached. 
Further, even if one were to accept the argument that California will 
not be able to mitigate climate change alone, California is neither banking 
on protecting itself through unilateral actions nor acting alone. California is 
being joined by Quebec, and three other Canadian provinces are consider-
ing joining the program.419 Nine states are already operating a cap-and-
trade program limited to the electricity sector, and they may eventually join 
California and Quebec.420 In addition, over thirty other countries will have 
operating cap-and-trade programs by 2013 and at least eight more are con-
sidering cap-and-trade programs.421 And these are just cap-and-trade 
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programs. Many other states and countries are taking action to reduce their 
GHG emissions in other ways.422 Rather than working alone, California is 
joining a global effort to combat climate change and is taking the lead to 
show the other states that a cap-and-trade program is feasible. What Cali-
fornia can accomplish must be assessed in light of the cooperative effort. 
While it is uncertain how many countries and states will follow California’s 
lead, it is certain that the more severe impacts of global climate change will 
not be averted or mitigated if no action is taken. 
To achieve actual reductions of its GHG emissions, California must 
prevent leakage and resource shuffling. As discussed supra,423 resource 
shuffling and leakage are threats to achieving actual reductions because they 
create the appearance of reductions without any reductions having taken 
place. Additionally, leakage and resource shuffling remove emissions from 
California’s regulatory regime, such that California would have a harder 
time reducing its GHG emissions even if it adjusted for these problems.  
However, there is a reasonable argument that California has no interest 
in preventing resource shuffling because the state can only regulate the 
emissions associated with its electricity consumption, such that it should be 
content with regulating the emissions from the new sources of the electrici-
ty that it consumes after leakage and resource shuffling have occurred. This 
argument has some intuitive appeal, but it should be rejected. Without the 
cap-and-trade program there would be a certain generation mix supplying 
electricity to California. California is implementing the cap-and-trade 
program to account for the GHG emissions associated with its current 
consumption of electricity from these sources. The program seeks to reduce 
the emissions intensity o� both the in-state generation mix and the out-of-
state generation mix that supplies electricity to California. The in-state 
generation mix will likely become cleaner as a result of the program. If 
resource shuffling occurs, the out-of-state generation mix that supplies 
electricity to California will not actually become cleaner overall, allowing 
importers to avoid legitimate regulation attached to their sale of electricity 
into California. Stated differently, changes made by businesses engaged in 
interstate commerce made for the sole purpose of avoiding state regulation 
should not allow them to circumvent the regulatory program when they are 
still availing themselves of the same benefits in the state. While the 
dormant Commerce Clause limits California’s ability to discriminate 
against interstate commerce, it does not require that interstate commerce 
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profit at California’s expense by avoiding legitimate regulations.424 
“[I]nterstate commerce may be made to pay its way.”425 
California must also show that the regulations advance its interests. 
The use of a default emission factor actually undermines California’s goal of 
achieving reductions of GHG emissions to some degree because imported 
electricity from renewable energy generators will be subject to the same 
compliance obligations as all other generation types when the renewable 
generators do not qualify as specified sources. With no reduced compliance 
obligations for renewable energy generators, no direct incentive will be 
created to shift the generation mix to cleaner generation types. However, 
California appears to have only two options: regulate unspecified imported 
electricity with a default emission factor, or not regulate unspecified im-
ported electricity at all. Using the default emission factor arguably advances 
the local purposes more than not using the default emission factor because 
if the default emission factor is not used, then high-emitting generators 
would structure their electricity sales to make the electricity unspecified. By 
applying a default emission factor, California is accounting for some of the 
emissions associated with the electricity, even though it is likely that these 
generators will still structure their transactions to take advantage of the 
lower default emission factor. Given the fact that generators have the ability 
to structure their transactions to change between the specified- and unspec-
ified-source categories, it is likely that low-emission generators will arrange 
their sales to make themselves specified sources, such that they will not 
have any compliance obligations. The ability of importers to adjust the 
applicable emissions rate is, however, limited to some degree by the prohi-
bition on resource shuffling. Using a default emission factor also helps 
prevent leakage and resource shuffling from draining the emissions reduc-
tions achieved by the rest of the cap-and-trade program and severely 
undermining its integrity. 
The final question is whether California has any less discriminatory al-
ternatives. It does not appear that California can achieve both, or either, of 
its purposes without using a default emission factor to calculate the compli-
ance obligations of at least some importers of unspecified electricity. After 
considering the issue, both California and New Jersey regulators concluded 
that a default emission factor has to be assigned to some imported electrici-
ty because it cannot be traced to a particular generator.426 Commentators 
are in accord, and no commentator has proffered a way to trace all electrici-
ty sales back to particular generators.427 In the absence of a feasible 
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alternative method of accounting for the emissions of imported electricity, 
the use of a default emission factor should stand. As the Court held in 
Maine v. Taylor: 
[T]he “abstract possibility” of developing [alternative] procedures, 
particularly when there is no assurance as to their effectiveness, 
does not make those procedures an “[a]vailabl[e] . . . nondiscrimi-
natory alternativ[e]” . . . . A State must make reasonable efforts to 
avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its borders, but 
it is not required to develop new and unproven means of protec-
tion at an uncertain cost.428 
Given the uniform position taken by regulators and commentators, the 
burden is on challengers to present a workable alternative. The stakes are 
high: if a court refuses to allow the use of an average, it will substantially 
impair the ability of states or regional consortiums to implement compre-
hensive cap-and-trade programs and achieve real reductions of GHG 
emissions. 
However, there appear to be a few potentially less discriminatory alter-
natives available for at least some of the unspecified electricity. First, 
California may need to relax the direct delivery requirement for electricity 
to be considered specified. While the direct delivery requirement is an 
important method of preventing resource shuffling, keeping the strong 
version of this requirement jeopardizes California’s ability to use a default 
emission factor. California appears to have the ability to track some electric-
ity that will currently be considered unspecified back to specific generators, 
as the RPS adjustment is being used to reduce the compliance obligations 
of importers of unspecified electricity from renewable generators.429 If 
California lacked the ability to trace this electricity back to a generator, 
then it would not be able to give the importers this downward adjustment. 
Rather, this appears to be electricity that can be traced back to a source but 
is not directly delivered, probably because the renewable generation source 
is intermittent and the electricity must be firmed and shaped before deliv-
ery. While it is not ideal from a regulatory standpoint, California should 
demonstrate its good faith to the courts by allowing all generators to which 
electricity can be traced to qualify as specified sources absent some indica-
tion of misconduct on the part of the generator or importer.  
Second, there is a potentially less discriminatory method of regulation 
that may warrant further investigation—what I call the “marketer average.” 
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The primary problem with regulating GHG emissions from electricity 
generation is that the electricity oftentimes cannot be traced back to any 
particular generator because it has been purchased and sold many times and 
mixed with other electricity.430 Once the electricity is generated and placed 
on the grid, it is indistinguishable from the other electricity on the grid. It 
is possible, however, to trace financial transactions from particular genera-
tors to particular purchasers (at least in most cases).  
Many marketers purchase their power from many individual genera-
tors. The main problem with determining the GHG emissions associated 
with electricity imported into California by marketers is that the electricity 
purchased from each generator is not segregated, making it generally im-
possible to correctly attribute any particular electricity to any particular 
generator when there are many purchases.431 However, this may not be 
necessary. California could require marketers selling electricity into Cali-
fornia to use a database to keep records of which generators they are 
purchasing from in the geographic areas from which electricity could be 
supplied to California. These purchases could be kept in chronological 
order, and there could be a running tally of the energy inventory that each 
marketer has. This inventory would not include electricity from generators 
that is contractually committed to specific purchasers (i.e., when the elec-
tricity from a particular generator is designated to fulfill a specific 
purchaser’s contract), as this electricity would not be available for sale into 
California as unspecified electricity.432 Each sale of electricity to any pur-
chaser would deplete this inventory, starting with the oldest purchase.  
The current inventory could be used to calculate the average GHG 
emissions per MWh, and this figure could be used to determine the mar-
keter’s compliance obligations when it imports electricity into California. 
Ideally, California could develop computer programs to streamline the 
collection and calculation of this information in real time. This would allow 
the calculation of particularized compliance obligations for marketers in a 
method similar to the way in which compliance obligations are calculated 
for generators with multiple co-located facilities that have different emis-
sions profiles (the emissions of all facilities are weighted and averaged to 
yield average emissions per MWh).433 This method of calculating compli-
ance obligations would have a good chance o� both surviving scrutiny and 
forcing a shift toward cleaner generation types. California would need to 
compensate marketers for the costs of administering the program, though, 
so that their compliance obligations are not more onerous than those of 
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their in-state peers. While seemingly plausible in theory, it is not clear if 
this approach is administratively feasible and therefore an available nondis-
criminatory alternative. 
Third, California could apply a default emission factor to electricity 
generated in California. This would potentially allow domestic and import-
ed electricity to be treated identically. However, requiring California to use 
a default emission factor for its own electricity would severely undermine 
the cap-and-trade program because it would make it very difficult to impose 
accurate GHG costs on domestic electricity. As the method of assigning 
GHG emissions becomes more accurate, the signal to shift to cleaner fuels 
becomes stronger and more GHG reductions are achieved. Therefore, 
courts should not require California to apply a default emission factor to 
electricity generated in-state. If the courts do require California to apply a 
default emission factor, it is unclear (1) to what electricity the default emis-
sion factor would need to be applied and (2) whether this could be a 
California-only default emission factor or whether California would need to 
use the same WECC default emission factor applied to imported electrici-
ty.  
Currently, specified and unspecified electricity are defined by attrib-
utes that only exist for imported electricity.434 More specifically, the 
requirement that the electricity be directly delivered to the California grid 
for the generator of the electricity to be considered a specified source can-
not be applied to California generators because their electricity will always 
be directly delivered to the grid. In order to be able to apply a default emis-
sion factor to both in-state and out-of-state electricity, California would 
need to alter the specified electricity requirements to make them applicable 
to both in-state and out-of-state electricity, such that they are treated iden-
tically. One potential way to do this is to shift the focus of the regulation 
from delivery to the California grid to delivery to a California utility or end 
user. Instead of defining specified sources as those that directly deliver to 
the California grid, California could define specified sources as those that 
directly deliver to California utilities or end users. CARB would need to 
evaluate this option to determine if it is workable, but it may be a viable 
way to make single definitions for specified and unspecified sources that 
would apply equally to in-state and out-of-state electricity. While this is not 
ideal from a regulatory standpoint because carbon pricing becomes less 
exact than it could be in California, it may allow the program to continue to 
operate effectively, if not optimally.  
If California is required to use a default emission factor for electricity 
generated in-state, California should be able to use a California-only default 
emission factor for its electricity. California’s electricity sector is  
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substantially cleaner than the surrounding states’ electricity sectors, making 
the WECC default emission factor too high.435 Other states would likely 
object to this approach, however, and ask to be assigned their own default 
emission factors. While this would be more ideal, it is not possible because 
most or all unspecified electricity cannot be traced back to its source, such 
that it would be impossible to apply state default emission factors even if 
they were developed. Accordingly, using a California-only default emission 
factor for California and a WECC default emission factor for other states is 
the closest that California can come to treating in-state and out-of-state 
electricity the same, if it is even feasible to do that. The recent Ninth Cir-
cuit decision upholding California’s LCFS supports this argument, as the 
court upheld the application of different default average emission values to 
fuels produced in California and fuels produced outside of California.436 
Fourth, California may be able to adapt the Western Renewable Energy 
Generation Information System (WREGIS) to track electricity throughout 
the WECC region. WREGIS is a voluntary, independent registry and 
tracking system for RECs that registers renewable generators, tracks how 
much power they produce, issues RECs to account for that generation, and 
tracks transactions involving RECs to avoid double counting.437 While 
WREGIS does not actually track the sale or flow of the electricity that 
corresponds to the RECs, a number of stakeholders have suggested that the 
WREGIS platform could be modified to track electricity from generator to 
end user.438 California has indicated that it may be possible to modify 
WREGIS in this manner (or use a different system), but it will undoubted-
ly take much time and investment to create a reliable tracking system.439 At 
this point, it is not clear that this tracking system can be developed, but 
California should begin investing in its development immediately. If the 
ability to track all electricity to its source could be developed, such that use 
of a default emission factor became unnecessary, regulation of imported 
electricity would become much simpler and more likely to survive a 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge. This would also make it more likely 
that other states would implement cap-and-trade programs, as it would be 
significantly easier to develop an effective program. At this point, this 
avenue is too uncertain a basis on which to invalidate California’s use of a 
default emission factor.440 
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b. The Default Emission Factor Chosen 
If an average (the default emission factor) can be used for unspecified 
imported electricity, the issue then becomes more specific: is the average 
chosen the least discriminatory (or most accurate) average that could be 
used? Traditional strict scrutiny analysis is ill-suited to this determination 
because it requires a comparison o� burdens but does not provide a method 
for quantifying the relative burdens in complicated situations.  
I propose the following framework for analysis to determine whether 
less discriminatory alternative averages are available. This framework for 
analysis adapts the traditional analysis used by the courts to the challenging 
regulatory situation presented here while staying true to the purposes un-
derlying the dormant Commerce Clause. Whether the average chosen is 
discriminatory should turn on whether the average places an equivalent 
burden on in-state and out-of-state parties and is the most accurate average 
available. A judge applying the equivalent burden test would review the 
method used to calculate the average for out-of-state parties (and in-state 
parties, if applicable), the possible alternative averages or information that 
could have been used instead, the regulatory burden on in-state parties, the 
regulatory burden on out-of-state parties, and the equivalence of the two 
burdens.  
The alternatives analysis would focus on whether the regulating state 
has used the most accurate and least discriminatory methodology for creat-
ing the average and whether it has used the most pertinent information in 
filling in the values used in the methodology. The State has the burden to 
show that it does not have more precise or less discriminatory alternatives 
that could be utilized to calculate the average but still achieve the local 
purpose being advanced by the law. When the plaintiff is challenging the 
underlying facts used to formulate the average, the judge should limit the 
challenge to the material facts and sources o� facts that the State is using in 
order to avoid protracted litigation aimed at delaying implementation of 
the state program. The question of alternatives is not which alternative best 
achieves the local purpose, but which alternative substantially achieves the 
local purpose using the least discriminatory means. 
Simply because a state could discount the average to help ensure that it 
is not in any way discriminatory should not suffice to make the chosen 
average discriminatory or to establish that there is a less discriminatory 
alternative, or the use of an average becomes pointless. Because, as pro-
posed above, an average can only be used when there are no non-average 
methods of achieving the local purpose, the court will have already deter-
mined that an average is a legitimate, if imprecise, method of regulation. 
The judge should review the relative burdens on in-state and out-of-state 
parties, in conjunction with the legislative or administrative history, to 
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determine whether a discriminatory purpose was clearly intended or dis-
crimination is the clear effect of the average. If such a purpose or effect is 
evident, a court would be warranted in requiring discounting of the average 
to reflect more accurately the burden on in-state parties.  
Given that averages are difficult to create, especially when they involve 
the informational complexities of, for example, the electricity markets, this 
test should adequately protect out-of-state interests.441 Rather than a “close 
enough for government work”442 rule, this rule simply acknowledges that 
difficult regulatory situations will arise in which it would be irresponsible to 
apply the simplifying assumptions behind the formalistic rule that are 
usually justified. This rule keeps true to the purpose of the dormant Com-
merce Clause, which is to prevent states from discriminating against 
interstate commerce to further their own economic interests.443 Regulations 
should not be prohibited simply because they must be complex to be effec-
tive. 
We now turn to an analysis of the default emission factor chosen, a dif-
ficult task. We must first assess the method used to create the default 
emission factor to determine if it is discriminatory and determine whether 
there are any less discriminatory alternative methods of calculating the 
default emission factor. California has calculated the default emission factor 
using the average emissions of marginal, unassigned facilities in the WECC 
region.444 A marginal facility is defined as one that operates at a capacity 
factor lower than 60 percent, which means that it generates less than 60 
percent of the electricity it could generate if it continuously produced its 
maximum generation capacity.445 “Unassigned facility” typically refers to a 
facility that is not contractually committed to providing electricity to par-
ticular customers. The default emission factor is initially set at 0.428 
MTCO2e/MWh,
446 but it will be updated for each compliance period to 
reflect changes in the emissions profiles of the marginal facilities in the 
WECC region.447 The other members of the WCI (which included seven 
states and four Canadian provinces when the default emission calculator 
was developed) supported the use and contributed to the development of 
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this method of calculating the default emission factor, which weighs in favor 
of using this method.448 
This method of calculation has both advantages and drawbacks based 
on space, time, and generator class, which are addressed in turn. First, the 
default emission factor is being calculated for the entire WECC region, 
which is quite large at 1.8 million square miles.449 This has the advantage of 
accounting for resource shuffling in the WECC region, as the single default 
emission factor takes into account all of the marginal generators in the 
region.450 The major drawback of this approach is that it makes the default 
emission factor less specific than it could be. If default emission factors 
were instead calculated for smaller regions, the factors would more closely 
match the emissions of the generators exporting from those regions.  
California could instead use the marginal, unassigned generation mix of 
the Northwest and Southwest regions to calculate and apply regional de-
fault emission factors to electricity imported into the state from those 
regions. Regional default emission factors would better approximate the 
emissions intensity of the imported electricity from each region, as there 
are substantial differences in the mix of electricity exported by each re-
gion.451 The Southwest exports electricity primarily from natural gas 
facilities, while the Northwest exports electricity from a mix of natural gas 
and hydropower facilities. Regional default emission factors have the ad-
vantage of making each importer’s compliance obligations closer to what 
they would be if the importer were an in-state generator. While the WECC 
default emission factor may be accurate in the aggregate, such that out-of-
state electricity is subject to the same regulatory burdens as in-state elec-
tricity, it shifts compliance costs among importers to a greater degree than 
is necessary or desirable. Additionally, regional default emission factors are 
likely to properly account for resource shuffling. It appears unlikely that 
importers could economically wheel power through the WECC region to 
take advantage of a lower default emission factor for one of the regions.452  
On balance, regional default emission factors appear superior and 
should be used i� feasible, as they allow relatively accurate accounting of the 
electricity imported from each region while accounting for resource shuf-
fling. While the regions are still large, there is no way to tie imported  
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electricity to particular states (which would allow calculation of default 
emission factors for each exporting state).453  
Second, a single default emission factor is in effect for an entire com-
pliance period (two or three years).454 This makes administration of the 
program considerably easier and provides regulated parties with clear guid-
ance. However, the emissions intensity of the marginal generators is not 
static. It varies constantly and can change substantially over time.455 There 
are several possible methods of calculating the default emission factor that 
could result in a more accurate number. California could calculate a new 
default emission factor for (1) each year; (2) each subset of a year, such as 
semiannually; or (3) every hour. Two or three years is a long period, and it 
creates the risk that there will be substantial reductions in the emissions 
intensity of the unspecified imported electricity that do not reduce the 
compliance obligations of importers. Recalculation every year, or even a 
shorter period such as six months, may be desirable, depending on recent 
advancements in emission-reduction technology and on the types of new 
facilities that are coming online.  
While it would be ideal (from an accuracy standpoint) to calculate the 
default emission factor using the smallest time increment possible, which is 
one hour, this appears infeasible for both California and industry, as this 
would require California to constantly recalculate the default emission 
factor and would require industry to record all energy transactions separate-
ly for each one-hour period.456 However, it appears that most stakeholders 
requested that California only calculate a new default emission factor for 
each compliance period in order to even out yearly variations and to pro-
vide them with the information necessary to plan their business affairs.457 
California should not be required to change parts of its program that were 
adopted at the request of the parties who would be challenging the pro-
gram. Regardless, while it would be time-consuming to recalculate the 
default emission factor more often, California would likely not face any 
serious problems if it were required to do so. 
Third, California has chosen to use marginal, unassigned generators to 
calculate the default emission factor. This appears to be the most accurate 
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class to use in calculating the default emission factor because marginal 
generators supply the vast majority of unspecified electricity.458 Facilities 
with high-capacity factors are running most of the time and are usually 
supplying baseload power under long-term contracts, which makes them 
eligible to be specified sources. Electricity from marginal generators is then 
used to supplement the baseload electricity on an as-needed basis and gen-
erally without long-term contracts, which usually makes the electricity 
unspecified. However, the requirement that specified electricity be directly 
delivered may result in some non-marginal generators being considered 
unspecified sources, especially renewable generators, in which case using 
the marginal generators may over-estimate the emissions of unspecified 
electricity.  
Additionally, California stated that it excluded hydropower from the 
marginal generator class459 even though hydropower facilities supply some 
marginal electricity because of their ability to quickly ramp up and down. 
California regulators excluded hydropower facilities on the basis that they 
are eligible to become specified sources,460 and this appears to be justified, 
as a large percentage of the hydropower imports come from Bonneville 
Power Administration, which was assigned a very low specified emission 
factor.461 It is possible that the new direct delivery requirement will result 
in a number o� hydropower facilities becoming unspecified sources, in 
which case they should be included in the calculation of the default emis-
sion factor. Other than hydropower, the marginal generators are almost 
always natural gas-fired facilities but may include some coal plants.462 
The remaining issue with this method is whether California is only in-
cluding marginal generators in its calculation by requiring that the facilities 
have a capacity factor lower than 60%.463 I� baseload generators, which are 
usually coal facilities that deliver specified electricity, are included, then the 
default emission factor may be artificially increased. While some hydro-
power and nuclear facilities provide baseload power and natural gas is on 
the rise, coal is the dominant provider o� baseload power.464 Baseload  
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generators usually have capacity factors over 70%.465 Setting the capacity 
factor at 60% appears reasonable, as it is far enough below the capacity 
factors o� baseload facilities that they are probably not being included in 
the class of generators used to calculate the default emission factor. 
Turning to the actual default emission factor chosen, the question is 
whether electricity generated in-state is subject to the same regulatory 
burden as electricity generated out-of-state. In order for the burden to be 
the same, the default emission factor must accurately reflect the average 
GHG emissions of an average MWh of imported unspecified electricity. 
Stated differently, the ideal default emission factor is the sum of all of the 
emissions associated with the imported unspecified electricity divided by 
the number o� MWhs imported. While we cannot directly calculate this 
number in practice because of the complexity of the electricity markets, this 
is the number we are attempting to calculate. If the default emission factor 
is set higher, then out-of-state generators are being discriminated against. If 
the default emission factor is set lower, then in-state generators are being 
discriminated against. 
The default emission factor chosen, 0.428 MTCO2e/MWh, appears 
reasonable. Most coal and nuclear facilities are tied up in long-term con-
tracts, preventing the electricity that they generate from being sold as 
unspecified electricity,466 which indicates that the default emission factor 
should at most be around the emissions of an average gas-fired facility. 
Instead o� being equivalent to the emissions of an average gas-fired facility, 
0.515 MTCO2e/MWh,
467 the default emission factor is substantially lower. 
However, looking at Alvarado and Griffin’s data from 2005, one would 
expect the default emission factor to be a little lower. Based on the 2005 
data, it appears that the average MWh of unspecified electricity would have 
associated emissions of around 0.407 MTCO2e/MWh.
468 However, the data 
used by Alvarado and Griffin is seven years out of date and the difference 
is likely due to changes in imports and changes in how specified and un-
specified electricity is defined. The difference between the two default 
emission factors is also small, although the difference would add up quickly 
for large generators. 
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The reasonableness o� both the method used and the default emission 
factor calculated is also supported by the fact that a number of industry 
stakeholders argued that California is underestimating the emissions of 
imported electricity.469 Some suggested that California calculate the default 
emission factor from the highest-emitting 25 percent of the marginal gener-
ators to prevent imported electricity from receiving more favorable 
treatment than electricity generated in-state.470 Many argued that the de-
fault emission factor was too low and did not reflect the emissions intensity 
of imported electricity.471 Overall, California has developed what appears to 
be a reasonable and nondiscriminatory method of calculating the default 
emission factor, although the refinements based on space and time suggest-
ed above may make the default emission factor more accurate and more 
likely to be upheld by a court. 
4. The Zero-Emissions Threshold for Imported Unspecified 
Electricity 
California is imposing compliance obligations for unspecified electrici-
ty from all out-of-state generators, but it is not imposing compliance 
obligations for electricity from in-state generators or specified out-of-state 
generators that emit less than 25,000 MTCO2e annually.
472 California is 
imposing compliance obligations for all unspecified electricity because there 
is no way to trace the electricity to particular generators to determine 
whether they emit 25,000 MTCO2e or more annually.
473 Additionally, 
California will be imposing compliance obligations for all imported electric-
ity, even from specified sources that emit less than 25,000 MTCO2e 
annually, beginning in 2015.474 California has chosen not to reduce the 
threshold for energy facilities located in California on the basis that they 
will be indirectly covered when fuel suppliers are regulated.475 
Imposing compliance obligations for all unspecified electricity but not 
for all in-state electricity from generators that emit less than 25,000 
MTCO2e appears discriminatory, as it places a higher burden on interstate 
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commerce than intrastate commerce. However, California has evaluated this 
issue using information from the United States Energy Information Ad-
ministration and from reporting from specified sources and determined 
“that almost none of the electricity imported from GHG emitting sources 
comes from power plants that emit less than 25,000” MTCO2e annually.
476 
So while the regulation appears facially discriminatory, its effects may not 
be. There is still a problem because California must show that no, rather 
than almost no, importers are being subjected to greater compliance obliga-
tions than in-state generators. If there are any unspecified out-of-state 
facilities that export power to California and emit less than 25,000 
MTCO2e annually, then California’s regulation will be considered discrimi-
natory. 
If this provision is considered discriminatory, it will be evaluated under 
strict scrutiny and California must establish that its regulation “advances a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”477 While this regulation advances a legiti-
mate local purpose, California has a reasonable non-discriminatory 
alternative. While, unfortunately, there is no way to differentiate unspeci-
fied electricity sold from facilities above and below the threshold, 
California can expand in-state regulation. California should be able to 
determine the lowest emitting out-of-state facility that likely exports power 
to the state. California can then reduce the threshold for compliance obliga-
tions to that level (or, to be safe, a little lower) in order to defeat any claims 
of discrimination. While California determined that it is infeasible to di-
rectly apply compliance obligations to very small in-state sources, this 
should not be a problem because very small out-of-state sources do not 
export their power to California.478  
While it would be administratively burdensome or even infeasible, it is 
possible that a court will require California to impose compliance obliga-
tions on all in-state generators to remedy the facial appearance of 
discrimination. California could potentially avoid this by changing the way 
the provisions are framed. California could create an initial presumption 
that all electricity is regulated, but then provide an exception for when in-
state or out-of-state entities demonstrate that the electricity came from a 
source that emits less than 25,000 MTCO2e annually. In-state and out-of-
state facilities below the threshold could get a standing exemption to sim-
plify things. This would create the same regulation, but without the facial 
discrimination. Although no importer of unspecified electricity could rebut 
the presumption, this regulation would not have discriminatory effects if no 
                                                                                                                      
 476. FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 742–43. 
 477. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t o� Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994). 
 478. FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, supra note 191, at 742–43. 
     
Fall 2013] The Constitutionality of California’s Cap-and-Trade Program 161 
electricity is imported from out-of-state generators that are below the 
threshold. While burdensome, this would allow California to achieve its 
regulatory goals. 
Regarding the 2015 changes, if California is right that imposing com-
pliance obligations on fuel distributors will indirectly impose full 
compliance costs on all in-state generators that emit less than 25,000 
MTCO2e annually, then there is no discrimination against interstate com-
merce and this part of the program will be upheld. Again, however, there is 
the possibility that a court will not look past the facial difference in treat-
ment and will require California to apply the same standard to in-state and 
out-of-state electricity, in which case California will have to regulate all 
generators. 
5. The Compliance Obligations for Transmission Line Losses 
California is imposing compliance obligations for transmission line 
losses for both specified and unspecified imported electricity.479 For speci-
fied electricity, compliance obligations are calculated based on the amount 
of electricity prior to transmission (i� known), thereby including the actual 
amount of electricity lost.480 When the original amount of imported elec-
tricity from specified sources is unknown, or when the electricity is 
imported from an unspecified source, compliance obligations are increased 
by 2 percent to account for transmission line losses.481  
While it would be ideal to include transmission line losses and account 
for all GHG emissions, doing so arguably discriminates based on place of 
origin even though transmission line losses are included in the compliance 
obligations of in-state generators (because their compliance obligations are 
calculated before transmission). The farther away from California the gen-
erator is located, the greater the importer’s compliance obligations. Thus, 
for the same amount of electricity delivered to California customers, im-
porters from far-away generators will have greater compliance obligations 
than generators located in or near California. California generators benefit 
because their electricity does not have to travel very far, such that transmis-
sion line losses are small. 
The key question, however, is whether there is some reason, apart from 
place of origin, to treat the electricity in this manner.482 While the in-
creased compliance costs dovetail with distance from California, compliance 
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costs are not increased based on the location of the generator. Rather, com-
pliance costs are higher because delivering the same amount of electricity 
resulted in generation of more GHG emissions. Thus, there is a clear and 
justifiable reason to include transmission line losses. Additionally, this 
works both ways. While distant generators will have higher compliance 
costs for electricity imported into California due to line losses, California 
generators will face higher compliance costs when exporting to the distant 
state. As such, both in-state and out-of-state generators are being treated 
the same and there is no discrimination based on place of origin. 
A district court struck down California’s LCFS in part because of a 
similar provision.483 The LCFS assigns an average GHG emissions intensi-
ty to various fuels in California and requires fuel providers with above-
average emissions intensity to purchase credits generated by providers with 
below-average emissions intensity.484 In calculating the emissions intensity 
of the fuel from each provider, the LCFS included the GHG emissions 
resulting from transportation of the fuel to California, as well as other 
transportation-related emissions.485 The district court held that the inclu-
sion of these emissions discriminated based on place of origin because they 
were determined by the location of the fuel provider.486 The Ninth Circuit 
recently reversed the district court’s decision on the grounds that California 
could legitimately consider the GHG emissions resulting from transporta-
tion,487 which bodes well for California’s cap-and-trade program. 
6. The Requirements for Out-of-State Facilities to Be Considered 
Specified Sources o� Imported Electricity 
California has established fairly stringent requirements that must be 
met before importers can claim specified-source status for out-of-state 
facilities and have their compliance obligations calculated by actual or gen-
eration-type emissions.488 California requires that the importer (1) be the 
facility operator of the source, have a long-term contract to purchase the 
electricity from the source, or have ownership rights in the source; (2) 
directly deliver the electricity; and (3) any associated RECs must be used 
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for compliance with the California RPS requirements.489 By contrast, there 
are no similar requirements for in-state facilities because they are directly 
regulated. California has adopted these requirements to prevent resource 
shuffling.490 
It is likely that there are out-of-state generators to which electricity can 
be traced but which do not meet the requirements to be specified sources. 
When the source of imported electricity can be identified, California could 
treat the out-of-state source the same as in-state sources by using actual 
emissions to calculate compliance obligations. While an accurate default 
emission factor will result in equal burdens on in- and out-of-state genera-
tors in the aggregate, it is discriminatory to impose higher compliance 
obligations (using the default emission factor) on out-of-state parties than 
comparable in-state parties when the emissions intensity of the imported 
electricity is ascertainable.  
This means that California must establish that its regulation “advances 
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”491 As discussed above,492 California has a 
strong local interest in preventing resource shuffling from undermining the 
cap-and-trade program. However, it has non-discriminatory alternatives 
that still allow it to substantially advance its interest. Although not all out-
of-state electricity can be traced to a specific source, California appears to 
have the ability to trace electricity back to more generators than those eligi-
ble to become specified sources. This is demonstrated by the RPS 
adjustment. California is providing the adjustment to importers o� RPS-
eligible electricity from sources that do not qualify as specified sources 
because the electricity is not directly delivered.493 In order to provide this 
adjustment, California must be able to trace the electricity back to particu-
lar renewable generators. Otherwise it would not be able to determine 
whether the electricity came from an RPS-eligible generator. Thus, the 
electricity that can be traced back to particular generators will probably 
need to have the associated compliance obligations calculated based on the 
actual emissions (if reliable data for calculating them is available) or fuel-
type emissions of the generating facility. While this increases the risk of 
resource shuffling, the prohibition against resource shuffling that CARB 
plans to adopt should adequately protect the cap-and-trade program.494 
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California should also require in-state RPS-eligible generators to retire 
the RECs associated with the electricity they sell in California. This would 
harmonize the in-state and out-of-state regulations and help prevent re-
source shuffling, as it would mean that the California RECs could not be 
used to satisfy RPS obligations in other states. This would have the effect 
of decreasing the amount o� low-emission electricity available to be import-
ed into California, absent increases in supply, because the RECs associated 
with that electricity would need to be used in other states (and imported 
RPS-eligible electricity only qualifies as specified electricity when it is 
accompanied by RECs). California should also work with and encourage 
the western states to adopt demanding RPSs to increase the demand for 
low-emission electricity and reduce the potential for resource shuffling.  
7. The Free Allocation of Allowances to Publicly Owned Utilities 
California is providing free allowances to POUs to cover the compli-
ance obligations arising from their generation of power for their 
customers.495 This means that POUs are receiving preferential treatment, as 
all private generators, both in- and out-of-state ones, must purchase allow-
ances to cover their compliance obligations. While in-state generators are 
being benefitted at the expense of out-of-state and other in-state genera-
tors, this is not a problem under the dormant Commerce Clause. Under the 
public entity exception, the government is allowed to favor itself over pri-
vate parties as long as no private parties are receiving preferential 
treatment.496 Under the cap-and-trade program, the only generators receiv-
ing preferential treatment are POUs, which are publicly owned and usually 
do not compete with private generators.497  
8. The Prohibition Against Resource Shuffling 
California has prohibited importers of out-of-state electricity from en-
gaging in resource shuffling.498 Resource shuffling is defined as “any plan, 
scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions reductions that have 
not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California grid.”499 
California has indicated that this provision is intended to avoid three pri-
mary types of resource shuffling: (1) changing unspecified sources to 
specified sources only when a lower emission factor is obtained (“cherry 
picking”); (2) replacing purchases from high-emitting facilities with pur-
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chases from existing low-emitting facilities to obtain a lower emission factor 
(“facility swapping”); and (3) changing a high-emission source from speci-
fied to unspecified to obtain a lower emission factor (“laundering”).500  
While this provision only applies to imported electricity, that is not a 
problem because in-state parties are unable to engage in resource shuf-
fling.501 Prohibiting the first and third types of resource shuffling is also not 
discriminatory. Those prohibitions prevent regulated parties from manipu-
lating the regulatory program to reduce their compliance obligations. They 
do not prevent any legitimate form of competition by out-of-state parties. 
However, prohibiting the second type of resource shuffling can be viewed 
as discriminatory. Once compliance obligations are imposed, the price of 
electricity from different sources changes and a new hierarchy of competi-
tiveness is created. Prohibiting facility swapping essentially prevents out-
of-state parties from re-allocating their electricity to remain competitive in 
the California market. This is especially true because imported electricity is 
generally dirtier than electricity generated in-state, such that it will, on 
average, have higher compliance obligations before it changes in response to 
the program.502 The better view is that this is not discriminatory because 
in-state generators have no way to alter their sales practices to escape regu-
lation, such that the program treats in-state and out-of-state parties the 
same and places them in the same position.  
If this provision is viewed as discriminatory, California must establish 
that its regulation “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be ade-
quately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”503 As 
discussed above,504 California has a strong interest in preventing resource 
shuffling from undermining the cap-and-trade program, and the prohibi-
tion directly advances that interest. Additionally, aside from prohibiting 
resource shuffling, California has no way to adequately prevent or reduce it. 
The main issue will be whether the prohibition is drafted narrowly and 
clearly enough to substantially achieve California’s goals while minimizing 
impacts on grid reliability and out-of-state transactions. California has 
temporarily suspended this provision because of concerns about grid relia-
bility,505 but it will likely become an important part of the program at a 
later date. 
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9. The Cap-and-Trade Program Falls More Heavily on Out-of-State 
Generators o� Electricity Than In-State Generators o� Electricity 
The cap-and-trade program will likely result in greater compliance ob-
ligations for out-of-state electricity than for in-state electricity because 
California has a relatively clean energy sector compared to some of the 
surrounding states, most notably Utah and Nevada, which produce a large 
amount of electricity from coal.506 When considering whether a state law 
has discriminatory effects, the court assesses the law’s effects on in-state 
and out-of-state activities to determine if it favors in-state activities by 
raising the costs for out-of-state businesses disproportionately507 or by 
eliminating competitive advantages enjoyed by out-of-state businesses as a 
result of their place of origin.508 A challenger must show that there is a shift 
in market share to succeed.509 
This differential impact of the program is not discriminatory in the 
constitutional sense because generators with the same emissions are being 
treated the same regardless of whether they are located in-state or out-of-
state. Stated differently, generation type is not an advantage enjoyed based 
on place of origin, but rather is a business decision unrelated to geograph-
ical location (aside, perhaps, from generation types that can only be located 
in certain areas, such as geothermal plants). This is similar to Exxon Corp. v. 
Governor of Maryland, in which the Supreme Court upheld a Maryland law 
that prohibited petroleum producers or refiners from operating any retail 
gas stations in the state because the prohibition did not result in a shift of 
market share to in-state businesses.510 While the law only applied to out-of-
state entities, preventing a subclass of them from participating in the Mary-
land retail gas station business, there were still other out-of-state entities 
participating in that business.511 Similarly, while the cap-and-trade program 
falls most heavily on coal generators, most of which are located out-of-state, 
other out-of-state generators that use different generation types will still be 
competitive with in-state generators. The facts here are even less compel-
ling than those in Exxon because California has not prohibited any out-of-
state parties from participating in California’s electricity market. Indeed, 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has expressly recognized that 
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California has the power “to favor particular generation technologies over 
others.”512 
Some courts have held that there is a competitive advantage based on 
place of origin when out-of-state parties are not subject to the same regula-
tions that disadvantage in-state parties.513 In order for this to apply, 
however, there must be separate laws that provide and remove the ad-
vantage, such that invalidating the law removing the advantage would not 
also invalidate the law creating the advantage.514 The cap-and-trade pro-
gram is a single regulatory scheme that is being simultaneously applied to 
both in-state and out-of-state parties, such that out-of-state parties cannot 
claim an advantage based on their place of origin under this theory. 
10. Possible Tax-and-Subsidy Scheme 
Finally, California must be careful to avoid a tax-and-subsidy scheme 
like that in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.515 California is requiring two 
categories of regulated entities to purchase allowances: (1) in-state industri-
al facilities that are not allocated enough allowances to meet their 
compliance obligations;516 and (2) in- and out-of-state electricity genera-
tors.517 Revenue from the sale of allowances to the first category of entities 
is being placed in the GHG Fund to provide funding for a wide array of 
projects that reduce GHG emissions.518 Revenue from the sale of allowanc-
es to the second category of entities is being given to the utilities to reduce 
the impact of the cap-and-trade program on ratepayers by providing them 
with rebates and by funding energy conservation measures.519  
California is basically taxing both in- and out-of-state electricity gener-
ators, with most of the generated revenue going to the utilities and the rest 
going to CARB or the legislature. The utilities are to spend the money 
primarily to benefit ratepayers through rebates and energy conservation 
measures. To the extent that the utilities, CARB, and the legislature have 
additional funds to spend, they need to be careful how they decide to spend 
them.  
California may need to be cautious as it decides what projects it will 
fund with the revenue it is receiving. If the funds are used to finance elec-
tricity-generating projects located in California or owned by Californians, 
the cap-and-trade program will be vulnerable to claims that a tax-and-subsidy 
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scheme has been created that taxes out-of-state generation of electricity and 
subsidizes in-state generation of electricity. To avoid this, any grants to 
generators or project developers that are financed by cap-and-trade funds 
should be blind as to state of residence and site location. Alternatively, and 
more simply, the funds should be used for measures other than electricity 
generation projects, and any subsidies given to electricity generators should 
come from the state’s general fund without reimbursement from the reve-
nue generated by the cap-and-trade program. While the latter is a  
formalistic distinction, it is one that the Court appears willing to enforce 
and accept.520  
Funds can safely be spent on research and development projects for 
new or improved energy technologies, as long as there is no limitation on 
where the technology can later be deployed. Even if the research and devel-
opment happens or demonstration projects are located in California, this is 
insufficient to create a tax-and-subsidy scheme because the industry being 
taxed is not the same industry being subsidized. Funds can also be spent to 
reduce GHG emissions, to provide consumer relief, to fund transportation 
projects, and to further a large number of other related purposes. California 
is playing it safe and so far has only considered funding the safe invest-
ments.521 
Additionally, it would be ideal for all of the funds from the sale of al-
lowances to stay out of the general fund. This would prevent any attempt to 
link legislative spending on or subsidizing of renewable energy projects to 
funds obtained from the sale of allowances. This is precisely what Califor-
nia is doing, as the legislature is requiring the auction proceeds to be placed 
in the GHG Fund or to be used by utilities to provide ratepayer relief.522 
If California subsidizes in-state electricity generation and a court de-
termines that California’s program constitutes a tax-and-subsidy scheme, 
California will be unable to prevail under strict scrutiny because it could 
simply stop subsidizing in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state 
interests. 
B. Does California’s Program Regulate Extraterritorially? 
In addition to being vulnerable to claims of discrimination, the cap-
and-trade program is vulnerable to the claim that it attempts to regulate 
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extraterritorially. The three-part test articulated by the Supreme Court 
provides a helpful framework for analysis.  
1. Direct Regulation of Out-of-State Activities 
“First, the ‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state 
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, 
whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.’”523 It is clear 
that this is not a situation in which a state regulation directly applies to 
commerce that takes place wholly outside of California’s borders. By its 
terms, the cap-and-trade program only applies to out-of-state parties when 
they voluntarily import electricity into California, and even then only regu-
lates the electricity that is being imported. 
2. Practical Effect of Controlling Out-of-State Activities 
Second, a state law that has the practical effect of controlling commerce 
that occurs completely outside a state’s boundaries is invalid, regardless of 
whether the legislature intended the law to have an extraterritorial reach.524 
This part of the extraterritoriality test will be the most difficult for Califor-
nia to overcome. California is indirectly regulating out-of-state commerce 
in two ways. First, California is indirectly regulating GHG emissions in 
other states by imposing compliance obligations for those emissions. Sec-
ond, California is indirectly regulating energy transactions in other states 
through its prohibition on resource shuffling. While California has tempo-
rarily suspended this provision because of concerns about grid reliability,525 
it will likely become an important part of the program at a later date. 
First, California is regulating imported electricity to account for and 
reduce the GHG emissions associated with its use of electricity. The major 
problem is that these GHG emissions occur outside of the state and com-
pliance obligations are calculated based on out-of-state activities, as the 
number of allowances that must be submitted is determined by the GHG 
emissions of the out-of-state generators (as well as the amount of electricity 
that the importer decides to import). Importers will have to account for 
these GHG compliance obligations when they purchase electricity from 
generators in other states, affecting both which generators are purchased 
from and what they are paid for their electricity. Some generators may have 
to install technology or otherwise take steps to reduce their GHG emis-
sions to maintain their competitiveness. 
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The critical question is whether these facts are sufficient to warrant the 
conclusion that the practical effect of the cap-and-trade program is to con-
trol out-of-state commerce. While the issue is close, the better view is that 
they do not. Although California is attempting to account for and reduce 
GHG emissions that occur outside of the state, it is not attempting to 
control the sources of those emissions. California has placed no limit on the 
GHG emissions of out-of-state generators, created no requirement that 
they install any GHG-reducing technology, and imposed no regulation on 
the energy transactions that take place outside of its borders. Rather, Cali-
fornia is regulating entities that import electricity into California from 
those sources, such that California is primarily regulating the effects of its 
use of electricity. To the extent that out-of-state businesses have to account 
for California’s regulations, this is a common feature of modern life. All 
states have complicated regulatory schemes. It is no more burdensome to 
account for GHG costs than to account for any other local regulations.  
While there are some parallels between the cap-and-trade regulation 
and the milk regulations in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., the cap-and-trade 
program is distinguishable. In Baldwin, New York required importers to pay 
the same minimum price to producers in other states that milk dealers were 
required to pay New York producers before they could sell their milk in 
New York.526 While not directly applying to the purchase of milk in other 
states, it had the effect of requiring importers to pay producers in other 
states the minimum price.527 Unlike the New York milk law, the cap-and-
trade regulations do not require importers to pay or refrain from paying 
anything to out-of-state generators. While it is likely that importers will 
demand discounts from high-emission generators, it is also likely that they 
will pay premiums to low-emission generators. California’s regulations only 
have incidental effects on the amounts that generators are paid and primari-
ly have the effect of shifting income among the different classes of 
generators for electricity that is being imported into California, which is 
insufficient for a successful challenge.528 
Critically, the New York law in Baldwin was intended to prevent and 
had the effect of preventing milk producers in other states from undersell-
ing milk producers in New York. It was not part of a single regulatory 
regime meant to achieve a legitimate purpose inside the state. Under the 
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cap-and-trade program, out-of-state generators can still undersell compara-
ble California generators by the same amount that they could before the 
program existed. The compliance costs increase uniformly for all electricity 
with comparable GHG emissions, such that any price differential between 
similarly situated in-state and out-of-state generators that previously exist-
ed is untouched. While high-emitting generators are now less competitive 
than low-emitting generators, in-state and out-of-state generators are af-
fected in precisely the same way.  
Second, California is indirectly regulating energy transactions in other 
states by prohibiting resource shuffling.529 California has indicated that this 
provision is intended to prevent three primary types of resource shuffling: 
(1) cherry picking, (2) facility swapping, and (3) laundering.530  
As noted above, the first and third types of resource shuffling are clear-
ly within California’s power to regulate, as they represent attempts by 
covered entities to manipulate the cap-and-trade regulations to reduce their 
compliance obligations. The second type of resource shuffling is more 
problematic because it involves the purchase or sale of electricity outside 
the state. California is regulating these transactions to some degree, as it is 
effectively prohibiting the importation of electricity from certain generators 
in certain circumstances. This means that some out-of-state energy transac-
tions will be different than they would be absent the resource shuffling 
provision.  
While the resource shuffling provision will have some effects on out-of-
state energy transactions, California has tailored it to only apply to entities 
that are engaging in activities within the state. The attestation requires that 
the importer certify that the electricity being imported is not being import-
ed as part of a “plan, scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions 
reductions that have not occurred.”531 As such, California is not truly con-
trolling anything that occurs outside of its borders. Businesses can engage 
in any out-of-state energy transactions that they want; they are only limited 
in what electricity they can import into California and even then only in 
certain circumstances.  
The extraterritorial effects of regulating GHG emissions and prohibit-
ing resource shuffling should be considered incidental. The 
extraterritoriality principle has been applied sparingly by courts and only in 
situations in which states were controlling conduct that occurred completely 
outside of the state. California is not controlling transactions occurring 
wholly outside of the state, and the regulations do not reduce the competi-
tiveness of out-of-state generators as compared to their identical in-state 
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peers. While California creates incentives to reduce GHG emissions and to 
not engage in resource shuffling, incentives do not constitute extraterritori-
al regulation. 
A district court initially struck down California’s LCFS after adopting 
a very broad reading of the extraterritoriality principle and holding that the 
incentives to reduce GHG emissions created by California’s LCFS amount-
ed to extraterritorial control of GHG emissions in other states.532 This 
broad reading would have disastrous consequences for state regulation on a 
host of different subjects, as most state regulations create some incentives 
for out-of-state parties to take some action. Additionally, given the entirely 
subjective nature of the district court’s new test (how much incentive is too 
much?), this broad reading would open the door for unwarranted judicial 
policymaking at the expense of elected officials. 
The Ninth Circuit recently reversed the district court with reasoning in 
line with the analysis presented in this Article.533 This case provides helpful 
precedent upholding California’s ability to create incentives for out-of-state 
parties doing business in California to reduce their GHG emissions. How-
ever, the cap-and-trade program has more onerous out-of-state impacts, 
particularly in connection with the resource-shuffling provisions, leaving 
some remaining uncertainty concerning whether courts will uphold Cali-
fornia’s cap-and-trade program against claims that it regulates 
extraterritorially. 
3. Interference with Regulations of Other States 
Third, the court must consider whether the state law interferes with the 
legitimate regulations of other states and what the effect would be if other 
states adopted similar laws.534 A party usually “must either present evidence 
that conflicting, legitimate legislation is already in place or that the threat 
of such legislation is both actual and imminent.”535 This part of the test also 
does not pose much threat to California’s program.  
There are three potential ways in which the cap-and-trade program’s 
regulation of imported electricity could interfere with the regulations of 
other states. First, it can be argued that the decision whether or not to 
regulate GHG emissions should be made by the state in which generators 
reside. If those states choose not regulate GHG emissions, then California 
is interfering with their decision to some degree by imposing compliance 
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obligations on electricity from those states. The better view is that Califor-
nia has left the decision to regulate those generators to the states in which 
they reside: it is only regulating electricity that enters California. Regard-
less of which view one takes, this general appeal to individual state policy 
determinations does not demonstrate the necessary interference or conflict 
with regulations adopted by other states for a successful challenge. 
Second, it is possible that the cap-and-trade program may conflict with 
the regulation of generators in other states. For example, other states may 
require facilities to have certain technology that is incompatible with the 
technology that most efficiently reduces GHG emissions. Even if such 
conflicts exist, as indeed they must for a challenge to be successful, Califor-
nia is not requiring any specific technology to be used by facilities in other 
states, even if that technology would benefit those facilities by reducing 
GHG emissions and corresponding compliance obligations. Because there 
are no specific requirements placed on out-of-state generators, there will 
never be an actual conflict between the cap-and-trade program and specific 
equipment or facility requirements placed on generators in other states. 
Finally, it is possible that interstate commerce would be double charged 
or face inconsistent obligations if the same regulatory regime were adopted 
in other states. Because California’s regulation includes a provision that 
exempts imported electricity from states with qualifying cap-and-trade 
programs from compliance obligations,536 this is not presently an issue, 
although it could become one in the future. If other states adopt cap-and-
trade programs, a refusal by California to waive compliance obligations for 
electricity from those states might violate the dormant Commerce Clause 
because generators would be subject to duplicate, inconsistent regulations. 
Additionally, it will probably be technically difficult, and in some cases 
impossible, to determine which state exported electricity in order to avoid 
double taxing unspecified electricity sold by marketers. Whether this be-
comes a problem is yet to be seen. 
C. If California’s Program Only Imposes Nondiscriminatory and Incidental 
Extraterritorial Burdens on Interstate Commerce, Will It Survive the Pike 
Balancing Test? 
If a court decides that California’s regulations do not discriminate 
against interstate commerce or regulate extraterritorially, the regulations 
will be assessed and likely upheld under the lenient Pike balancing test. 
“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
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will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”537 “State laws frequently 
survive this Pike scrutiny.”538 The three prongs of this test are addressed in 
turn. 
First, California must have a legitimate local public interest that is be-
ing served by the regulation.539 California clearly has a strong interest in 
mitigating climate change by reducing GHG emissions given the impacts 
that climate change will have on the state. The impacts that climate change 
will have on California540 and the strength of California’s interest in miti-
gating climate change541 were discussed supra. 
Second, there are burdens imposed on interstate commerce by Califor-
nia’s regulation of imported electricity.542 California is burdening interstate 
commerce by imposing compliance obligations on importers. For most 
importers, this burden is identical to that faced by in-state generators, 
making the burden minimal because it is simply an added cost of doing 
business in California. The regulations should not discourage most import-
ers from selling electricity into California because electricity prices in 
California will increase to account for compliance costs. A profitable mar-
ketplace will make it worthwhile for importers to continue serving 
California’s electricity needs. There may be a greater burden if the default 
emission factor chosen is less accurate than it could be, as this would impose 
more onerous compliance obligations on some importers than is necessary 
and may alter market behavior in a way that affects electricity flows.543 
Greater burdens on interstate commerce are imposed by California’s re-
source shuffling prohibition. By prohibiting importation of electricity that 
was purchased as part of a scheme or plan to reduce compliance obligations 
without reducing emissions, California will cause changes in the interstate 
electricity market and will force some importers to not undertake actions 
that they would have otherwise undertaken. The worst problems arise from 
the lack of clarity regarding what is actually prohibited, which is what led to 
its temporary suspension. While there is an intent requirement, it is not 
clear what constitutes a scheme or plan to illicitly reduce compliance obliga-
tions and what constitutes legitimate business activity. Quite a few 
stakeholders raised this concern during the vetting of the regulations.544 If 
importers are unsure what transactions are prohibited, this could create 
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instability in the interstate electricity market. One of the five commission-
ers of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission called on California to 
either clarify the prohibition or discard it, warning that an unclear prohibi-
tion of resource shuffling could cause serious grid reliability problems.545 In 
response, California has temporarily suspended this provision,546 but it will 
likely become an important part of the program at a later date. 
Another potential issue is grid reliability. The New York Independent 
System Operator conducted a study of the RGGI in 2008 and determined 
that there could be a risk of grid unreliability if there were insufficient 
allowances to allow all needed power to be supplied.547 This issue was not 
raised in later reports, so this risk does not appear to have materialized as a 
result of the RGGI cap-and-trade program. California has worked closely 
with CAISO in designing its cap-and-trade regulations, so presumably the 
cap-and-trade program has been designed with either no or only slight risks 
to grid reliability.548  
The next task is to weigh California’s local benefits against the burden 
on interstate commerce to determine if “the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”549 On 
balance, California’s interests outweigh the burden on interstate commerce, 
at least if California clarifies the resource shuffling prohibition before im-
plementing it. The burdens on interstate commerce are not insignificant, 
but they are primarily the type o� burden that accompanies a great many 
state regulations—increased costs and administrative work. We are not 
dealing with a suspicious state regulation “requiring business operations to 
be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed 
elsewhere.”550 California should, however, work to clarify the resource shuf-
fling prohibition and to fine-tune the default emission factor in order to 
further reduce burdens on interstate commerce.  
While California’s interests outweigh the burdens on interstate com-
merce, this is not required for its regulations to survive Pike scrutiny. The 
test requires that “the burden imposed on such commerce [be] clearly exces-
sive in relation to the putative local benefits”551 for a law to be invalid. A 
court need not decide with certainty whether the state’s law will achieve its 
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goals, for it assesses the law’s putative benefits. As long as it is debatable 
that the law will advance the legitimate local interests, questions of efficacy 
and efficiency are for the legislature.552 This is well-illustrated by Minnesota 
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., in which the Supreme Court upheld a Minne-
sota law that was as likely to achieve its goal as to undermine it.553 
Uncertainty in scientific predictions of climate change seems to be an im-
provement over the state of affairs in Clover Leaf, as in that case there was 
directly contradictory evidence of approximately equal weight to the evi-
dence on which the legislature relied. 
Finally, California must not have any less burdensome alternative 
methods to accomplish its purpose.554 California is regulating imported 
electricity the way it is because of the unique difficulties associated with 
regulating imported electricity, and there do not appear to be alternatives to 
the general method of regulation chosen. California can clarify the resource 
shuffling prohibition, which is the one of the main burdens on interstate 
commerce. Otherwise, the only option that California has to avoid impos-
ing a burden on interstate commerce is to not regulate imported electricity. 
However, this is not really an option. Not regulating imported electricity 
would significantly undermine the cap-and-trade program. Additionally, 
the fact that California may be able to find other ways to reduce GHG 
emissions is insufficient to warrant invalidation of the regulation of import-
ed electricity. California is reducing GHG emissions through all possible 
avenues, which prevents there from being any alternative methods to 
achieve the same reductions. 
In sum, the parts of California’s program that are assessed under the 
Pike balancing test should be upheld because the burdens on interstate 
commerce are not clearly excessive to the putative local benefits to the state. 
This may, however, require reevaluation if the use of a default emission 
factor or the resource shuffling prohibition have greater effects on interstate 
commerce than is predicted here. 
CONCLUSION 
California has once again taken the lead in pioneering environmental 
regulations to address one of the most important environmental threats of 
our time. This bold new regulatory program is at serious risk of invalidation 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, and only time will tell if California’s 
cap-and-trade program will survive the challenge that is sure to come. 
While California’s regulations are ideal from a regulatory standpoint, it is 
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unlikely that a court will uphold all of them in their current form. In the 
process of reaching this conclusion, I have proposed a number of refine-
ments that are more likely to withstand a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge while still achieving significant reductions of GHG emissions and 
preventing leakage and resource shuffling. 
The success of California’s program is vital to national and internation-
al efforts to reduce GHG emissions. If the program is successful, it is likely 
that other states will join California by implementing cap-and-trade pro-
grams of their own. Given that the United States is the second largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases in the world and one of the primary barriers to 
international action, a successful California program could be the catalyst 
for serious international efforts to reduce greenhouse gases to avert the 
worst impacts of climate change. If the program is derailed by lawsuits or 
excessive costs, it could spell the end for cap-and-trade in the United 
States. 
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